

Truth Assignments and Truth Tables

Outline

- 1 Overview
- 2 Example
- 3 Extensions to Truth Assignments
- 4 Tautological Implication
- 5 P v. NP Problem
- 6 Where we Stand

Syntax, done. Semantics next

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
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 - Infinite sets? (later...)

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
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


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


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


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
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Say v **satisfies** τ , since the root of the tree is T .

Truth Table—One Row


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A	B	(A → (B ∨ (¬ B)))
<i>T</i>	<i>F</i>	


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
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
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Wff is true for **all** assignments to relevant sentence symbols. A **tautology**.

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$n > 1$

- List all assignments to $\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_{n-1}$, recursively, and also put $v(\mathbf{A}_n) = T$ in each assignment; then
- again list all assignments $\mathbf{A}_1, \dots, \mathbf{A}_{n-1}$, recursively, but this time also put $v(\mathbf{A}_n) = F$ in each assignment.

Inductively, there are 2^n .

A	B
T	T
F	T
T	F
F	F

Tautology and Truth Table Example

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The “top level” WFF is *T* under all truth assignments to the sentence symbols.

Note on Implication

α	β	$(\alpha \rightarrow \beta)$
T	T	T
F	T	T
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This is our (common) semantics for $\rightarrow$. (No objections allowed.)

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We say φ **is satisfiable** if some v satisfies φ .

All definitions

α	β	$(\neg\alpha)$	$(\alpha \wedge \beta)$	$(\alpha \vee \beta)$	$(\alpha \rightarrow \beta)$	$(\alpha \leftrightarrow \beta)$
T	T	F	T	T	T	T
F	T	T	F	T	T	F
T	F		F	T	F	F
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All is well (for our parenthesized WFFs), but proof will come later.

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Note: $\models \varphi$ iff $\neg\varphi$ is **not** satisfiable.

Tautology Examples

De Morgan:

$$(\neg(\mathbf{A} \wedge \mathbf{B})) \leftrightarrow ((\neg\mathbf{A}) \vee (\neg\mathbf{B}))$$

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Note:

- Since $(\alpha \vee \beta) \models \neg((\neg\alpha) \wedge (\neg\beta))$, we don't need $\vee$ if we have $\wedge$ and $\neg$.
- There's a duality between $\vee$ and $\wedge$.

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$$((\mathbf{A} \rightarrow \mathbf{B}) \leftrightarrow ((\neg \mathbf{B}) \rightarrow (\neg \mathbf{A}))).$$

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Double negative

$$(\mathbf{A} \leftrightarrow (\neg(\neg \mathbf{A}))).$$

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See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sidney_Morgenbesser for more Morgenbesserisms.

Truth and Truth Tables

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For **finite** Σ , we can enumerate truth assignments to relevant sentence symbols and use the truth table method to check tautological implication.

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The interesting case: Infinite Σ . Several v 's satisfy all $\sigma \in \Sigma$ and several v 's do not. Showing $\Sigma \models \tau$ says something (new?) about a large set of v 's. What is true in the **theory of Σ** ?

Example—Multiplication

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 \hline
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 \cdots & \mathbf{A}_7 & \\
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
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- Major open problem—P v. NP problem.
- Probably need time 2^n .
- Clay \$1M problem.
- At least as hard as **thousands** of other common problems with no efficient algorithm. (So many smart people have (implicitly) tried and failed to solve this problem efficiently.)


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
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
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I.e., can we assign everyone to three committees, respecting stated conflicts?


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
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says that vertex 1 gets **at least** one color.

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
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$$E(1, 2, \text{red}) = \neg(C(1, \text{red}) \wedge C(2, \text{red}))$$

says that vertices 1 and 2 are not both colored red. (Repeat for each edge and each color.)

Punchline

Theorem

Let φ be the AND of all the constraints (at least one color per vertex, at most one color per vertex, no monochromatic edges.)

*Then G is 3-colorable iff φ is satisfiable iff $\neg\varphi$ is **not** a tautology.*

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- No one knows how to solve the 3-colorability problem quickly.

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Learn secret key, one bit at a time. Trillions of dollars are betting no.

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Procedures without proofs

We have procedures for most of the relevant tasks, but no proofs yet.

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- Express basic English(?) concepts in Boolean logic (colorability, multiplication, ...)

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 - Given (a description of) Σ , rattle off all the τ for which $\Sigma \models \tau$.
 - We may not be able to decide, given Σ and τ , whether $\Sigma \models \tau$.