


Malware Detection and Evasion



Virus



Virus




Illustration: Chris Bickel/Science. Reprinted with permission from Science Vol. 312, page 380 (21 April 2006) © 2006 by AAAS

Basic AV Signatures

```
rule silent_banker : banker
{
    meta:
        description = "This is just an example"
        thread_level = 3
        in_the_wild = true

    strings:
        $a = {6A 40 68 00 30 00 00 6A 14 8D 91}
        $b = {8D 4D B0 2B C1 83 C0 27 99 6A 4E 59 F7 F9}
        $c = "UVODFRYSIHLNWPEJXQZAKCBGMT"

    condition:
        $a or $b or $c
}
```

Also: regex, operators, etc.

Virus Concealment


- Undermining the AV
- X-morphism
 - Poly-morphism
 - Meta-morphism

Virus Concealment

- Poly/Meta-morphism
 - Change form upon replication
 - Keep function
- Packers: Encryption + Compression
 - Each iteration: different key




Bundlers
Virtualisers
Compressors



Metamorphism Examples

- Win32/Ghost
 - Reorder the subroutines
 - 10 subroutines
 - How many possible variants?
- Detection?

General-purpose Registers



December, 1998 – Win95 / **Regswap***

5A	pop edx
BF <u>04000000</u>	mov edi, 0004h
<u>8B</u> F5	mov esi, ebp
B8 <u>0C000000</u>	mov eax, 000Ch
<u>81</u> C2 <u>88000000</u>	add edx, 0088h
<u>8B</u> 1A	mov ebx, [edx]
<u>89</u> 9C86 <u>18110000</u>	mov [esi+eax*4+00001118], ebx

58	pop eax
BB <u>04000000</u>	mov ebx, 0004h
<u>8B</u> D5	mov edx, ebp
BF <u>0C000000</u>	mov edi, 000Ch
<u>81</u> C0 <u>88000000</u>	add eax, 0088h
<u>8B</u> 30	mov esi, [eax]
<u>89</u> B4BA <u>18110000</u>	mov [edx+edi*4+00001118], esi

Unchanged code underlined, so wildcard-string detection should still spot (e.g. 81***181100008B**...).

* does what?

July, 2000 – Win32/Evol

Uses machine code instruction equivalences.
Also inserts garbage.

a. An early generation:

```
C7060F000055      mov dword ptr [esi],5500000Fh  
C746048BEC5151    mov dword ptr [esi+0004],5151EC8Bh
```

b. And one of its later generations:

```
BF0F000055      mov edi,5500000Fh  
893E            mov [esi],edi  
5F             pop edi  
52             push edx  
B640           mov dh,40  
BA8BEC5151     mov edx,5151EC8Bh  
53             push ebx  
8BDA           mov ebx,edx  
895E04         mov [esi+0004],ebx
```

- **Magic DWORDS (e.g. 5500000Fh) changed also**
 - Wild-card string detection fails after 3rd generation.


September, 2000 - Win95/Zperm

- Inserts garbage instructions
- Replaces single instructions with equivalent ones.

`xor eax, eax` → `sub eax, eax`

- Reorders jump instructions
- Search string detection will not work.
- Permutations are $n!$
 - Where n = number of core virus code instructions.

Zperm Example



The End

PCs vs. UNIX

- Why were PCs more vulnerable to viruses?
- Hence

Undermining AV

- AV
 - TSR: Terminate-Stay-Resident
 - Modified interrupts
- Undermining AV
 - Get underneath the AV's interrupts

Virus Concealment


- Code changes
 - Basic: Intersperse instructions with NO-Ops
 - Intermediate: Reorder instructions that are not dependent or exchange registers
 - Intermediate: Use equivalent operations
 - Advanced: Redirection of data access through pointers, strange jumps, etc.

Class Business

- Exam I
 - Monday 10/17, in class
 - 80 min.
 - 1 page of notes, 2-sided
 - Any font size
- Grades on Moodle

Lab 2

- Appended virus
- Tricky
 - (partial credit)
- Lab Timings



Virus Signatures

- Virus cannot be completely invisible
 - Stored somewhere in the system
 - Need to actively “play” in the system
 - Have patterns
- Virus scanner: looking for virus signatures

First Generation

- Simple scanners
 - Storage: file size, file checksum
 - Bit patterns
- Limitations?

Advanced Defenses

- Heuristic Detection
- System-level Defenses
- Malware Analysis

Heuristic Detection

- Watching for possibly malicious strings
 - Any examples?
- Host-based IDS
 - Statistical Methods

Integrity Checking

- Tripwire
 - Perhaps just start/end of file
 - Must keep the DB somewhere
 - Access control can help
 - Targeted: only commonly mod' d files
- Bait files
 - If modified, likely malware

System-level Defense

- Behavior-blocking software (book)
- Clear distinction between data and executable
 - Virus must write to program
 - Write only allowed to data
 - Must execute to spread/act
 - Data not allowed to execute
 - Auditable action required to change data to executable

Malware Analysis

- Complex systems approaching the PVC:
 - variable/memory emulator
 - parser
 - flow analyzer
 - disassembler/emulator
 - weight-based and/or rule based system
- Not real-time
 - Part of the Digital Immune System (book)

Emulation

- Sandbox
- Emulate initial program activity
 - Does it modify it's code?
 - Does it eventually look like a known virus?
 - Does it search for executable files?