First-order logic

Chapter 7, AIMA2e Chapter 8

Outline

- ♢ Why FOL?
- ♢ Syntax and semantics of FOL
- ♢ Fun with sentences
- ♢ Wumpus world in FOL

Pros and cons of propositional logic

😊 Propositional logic is *declarative*: pieces of syntax correspond to facts

😊 Propositional logic allows partial/disjunctive/negated information
(unlike most data structures and databases)

😊 Propositional logic is *compositional*:
meaning of $B_{1,1} \wedge P_{1,2}$ is derived from meaning of $B_{1,1}$ and of $P_{1,2}$

😊 Meaning in propositional logic is *context-independent*
(unlike natural language, where meaning depends on context)

☹ Propositional logic has very limited expressive power
(unlike natural language)
E.g., cannot say "pits cause breezes in adjacent squares"
except by writing one sentence for each square

First-order logic

Whereas propositional logic assumes world contains *facts*,
first-order logic (like natural language) assumes the world contains

- Objects: people, houses, numbers, theories, Ronald McDonald, colors, baseball games, wars, centuries . . .
- Relations: red, round, bogus, prime, multistoried . . ., brother of, bigger than, inside, part of, has color, occurred after, owns, comes between, . . .
- Functions: father of, best friend, third inning of, one more than, beginning of . . .

Logics in general

Language	Ontological Commitment	Epistemological Commitment
Propositional logic	facts	true/false/unknown
First-order logic	facts, objects, relations	true/false/unknown
Temporal logic	facts, objects, relations, times	true/false/unknown
Probability theory	facts	degree of belief $\in [0, 1]$
Fuzzy logic	degree of truth $\in [0, 1]$	known interval value

Syntax of FOL: Basic elements

Constants	$KingJohn,\ 2,\ UCB, \ldots$
Predicates	$Brother,\ >, \ldots$
Functions	$Sqrt,\ LeftLegOf, \ldots$
Variables	$x,\ y,\ a,\ b, \ldots$
Connectives	$\land\ \lor\ \neg\ \Rightarrow\ \Leftrightarrow$
Equality	$=$
Quantifiers	$\forall\ \exists$

Atomic sentences

Atomic sentence	=	$predicate(term_1, \ldots, term_n)$
		or $term_1 = term_2$
Term	=	$function(term_1, \ldots, term_n)$
		or $constant$ or $variable$

E.g., $Brother(KingJohn, RichardTheLionheart)$

$> (Length(LeftLegOf(Richard)),$

$Length(LeftLegOf(KingJohn)))$

Complex sentences

Complex sentences are made from atomic sentences using connectives

$$\neg S, \quad S_1 \wedge S_2, \quad S_1 \vee S_2, \quad S_1 \Rightarrow S_2, \quad S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$$

E.g. $Sibling(KingJohn, Richard) \Rightarrow Sibling(Richard, KingJohn)$

$>(1,2) \vee \leq(1,2)$

$>(1,2) \wedge \neg{>}(1,2)$

Truth in first-order logic

Sentences are true with respect to a model and an interpretation

Model contains ≥ 1 objects (domain elements) and relations among them

Interpretation specifies referents for

constant symbols $\rightarrow$ objects

predicate symbols $\rightarrow$ relations

function symbols $\rightarrow$ functional relations

An atomic sentence $predicate(term_1, \ldots, term_n)$ is true
iff the objects referred to by $term_1, \ldots, term_n$
are in the relation referred to by $predicate$

Models for FOL: Example



Models for FOL: Lots!

We *can* enumerate the models for a given KB vocabulary:

For each number of domain elements n from 1 to ∞

For each k-ary predicate P_k in the vocabulary

For each possible k-ary relation on n objects

For each constant symbol C in the vocabulary

For each choice of referent for C from n objects . . .

Computing entailment by enumerating models is not going to be easy!

Universal quantification

$\forall < variables > \ < sentence >$

Everyone at GMU is smart:
$\forall x \ \ At(x, GMU) \Rightarrow Smart(x)$

$\forall x \ \ P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being each possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the conjunction of instantiations of P

$$\begin{array}{ll} & At(KingJohn, GMU) \Rightarrow Smart(KingJohn) \\ \wedge & At(Richard, GMU) \Rightarrow Smart(Richard) \\ \wedge & At(Mason, GMU) \Rightarrow Smart(Mason) \\ \wedge & \ldots \end{array}$$

A common mistake to avoid

Typically, $\Rightarrow$ is the main connective with $\forall$

Common mistake: using $\wedge$ as the main connective with $\forall$:

$$\forall\, x \;\; At(x, GMU) \wedge Smart(x)$$

means "Everyone is at GMU and everyone is smart"

Existential quantification

$\exists < variables > \; < sentence >$

Someone at Madison is smart:
$\exists\, x \;\; At(x, Madison) \land Smart(x)$

$\exists\, x \;\; P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being *some* possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the disjunction of instantiations of P

$$\begin{array}{ll} & At(KingJohn, Madison) \land Smart(KingJohn) \\ \lor & At(Richard, Madison) \land Smart(Richard) \\ \lor & At(Madison, Madison) \land Smart(Madison) \\ \lor & \ldots \end{array}$$

Another common mistake to avoid

Typically, $\wedge$ is the main connective with $\exists$

Common mistake: using $\Rightarrow$ as the main connective with $\exists$:

$$\exists x \;\; At(x, Madison) \Rightarrow Smart(x)$$

is true if there is anyone who is not at Madison!

Properties of quantifiers

$\forall x \ \forall y$ is the same as $\forall y \ \forall x$ (why??)

$\exists x \ \exists y$ is the same as $\exists y \ \exists x$ (why??)

$\exists x \ \forall y$ is not the same as $\forall y \ \exists x$

$\exists x \ \forall y \ Loves(x, y)$
"There is a person who loves everyone in the world"

$\forall y \ \exists x \ Loves(x, y)$
"Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person"

Quantifier duality: each can be expressed using the other

$\forall x \ Likes(x, IceCream) \qquad \neg\exists x \ \neg Likes(x, IceCream)$

$\exists x \ Likes(x, Broccoli) \qquad \neg\forall x \ \neg Likes(x, Broccoli)$

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Brother(x, y) \Rightarrow Sibling(x, y).$

“Sibling” is symmetric

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Brother(x, y) \Rightarrow Sibling(x, y).$

"Sibling" is symmetric

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Sibling(x, y) \Leftrightarrow Sibling(y, x).$

One's mother is one's female parent

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Brother(x, y) \Rightarrow Sibling(x, y)$.

"Sibling" is symmetric

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Sibling(x, y) \Leftrightarrow Sibling(y, x)$.

One's mother is one's female parent

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Mother(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (Female(x) \land Parent(x, y))$.

A first cousin is a child of a parent's sibling

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Brother(x, y) \Rightarrow Sibling(x, y).$

"Sibling" is symmetric

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Sibling(x, y) \Leftrightarrow Sibling(y, x).$

One's mother is one's female parent

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Mother(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (Female(x) \wedge Parent(x, y)).$

A first cousin is a child of a parent's sibling

$\forall\, x, y \;\; FirstCousin(x, y) \Leftrightarrow$
$\exists\, p, ps \;\; Parent(p, x) \wedge Sibling(ps, p) \wedge Parent(ps, y)$

Equality

$term_1 = term_2$ is true under a given interpretation
if and only if $term_1$ and $term_2$ refer to the same object

E.g., $1 = 2$ and $\forall x \;\; \times(Sqrt(x), Sqrt(x)) = x$ are satisfiable

$2 = 2$ is valid

E.g., definition of (full) $Sibling$ in terms of $Parent$:

$$\forall x, y \;\; Sibling(x, y) \Leftrightarrow [\neg(x = y) \land \exists m, f \;\; \neg(m = f) \land Parent(m, x) \land Parent(f, x) \land Parent(m, y) \land Parent(f, y)]$$

Interacting with FOL KBs

Suppose a wumpus-world agent is using an FOL KB
and perceives a smell and a breeze (but no glitter) at $t = 5$:

$Tell(KB, Percept([Smell, Breeze, None], 5))$
$Ask(KB, \exists a \;\; Action(a, 5))$

I.e., does the KB entail any particular actions at $t = 5$?

Answer: $Yes,\ \{a/Shoot\}$ $\leftarrow$ substitution (binding list)

Given a sentence S and a substitution σ,
$S\sigma$ denotes the result of plugging σ into S; e.g.,
$S = Smarter(x, y)$
$\sigma = \{x/Hillary, y/Bill\}$
$S\sigma = Smarter(Hillary, Bill)$

$Ask(KB, S)$ returns some/all σ such that $KB \models S\sigma$

Knowledge base for the wumpus world

"Perception"

$\forall\, b, g, t \;\; Percept([Smell, b, g], t) \Rightarrow Smelt(t)$

$\forall\, s, b, t \;\; Percept([s, b, Glitter], t) \Rightarrow AtGold(t)$

Reflex: $\forall\, t \;\; AtGold(t) \Rightarrow Action(Grab, t)$

Reflex with internal state: do we have the gold already?

$\forall\, t \;\; AtGold(t) \wedge \neg Holding(Gold, t) \Rightarrow Action(Grab, t)$

$Holding(Gold, t)$ cannot be observed

$\Rightarrow$ keeping track of change is essential

Deducing hidden properties

Properties of locations:

$\forall\, x, t \;\; At(Agent, x, t) \wedge Smelt(t) \Rightarrow Smelly(x)$

$\forall\, x, t \;\; At(Agent, x, t) \wedge Breeze(t) \Rightarrow Breezy(x)$

Squares are breezy near a pit:

Diagnostic rule—infer cause from effect

$$\forall\, y \;\; Breezy(y) \Rightarrow \exists\, x \;\; Pit(x) \wedge Adjacent(x, y)$$

Causal rule—infer effect from cause

$$\forall\, x, y \;\; Pit(x) \wedge Adjacent(x, y) \Rightarrow Breezy(y)$$

Neither of these is complete—e.g., the causal rule doesn't say whether squares far away from pits can be breezy

Definition for the $Breezy$ predicate:

$$\forall\, y \;\; Breezy(y) \Leftrightarrow [\exists\, x \;\; Pit(x) \wedge Adjacent(x, y)]$$

Keeping track of change

Facts hold in situations, rather than eternally

E.g., $Holding(Gold, Now)$ rather than just $Holding(Gold)$

Situation calculus is one way to represent change in FOL:

Adds a situation argument to each non-eternal predicate

E.g., Now in $Holding(Gold, Now)$ denotes a situation

Situations are connected by the $Result$ function

$Result(a, s)$ is the situation that results from doing a in s



Describing actions I

"Effect" axiom—describe changes due to action

$\forall s \;\; AtGold(s) \Rightarrow Holding(Gold, Result(Grab, s))$

"Frame" axiom—describe non-changes due to action

$\forall s \;\; HaveArrow(s) \Rightarrow HaveArrow(Result(Grab, s))$

Frame problem: find an elegant way to handle non-change

(a) representation—avoid frame axioms

(b) inference—avoid repeated "copy-overs" to keep track of state

Qualification problem: true descriptions of real actions require endless caveats—what if gold is slippery or nailed down or . . .

Ramification problem: real actions have many secondary consequences—what about the dust on the gold, wear and tear on gloves, . . .

Describing actions II

Successor-state axioms solve the representational frame problem

Each axiom is "about" a predicate (not an action per se):

$$\text{P true afterwards} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad [\text{an action made P true}$$
$$\lor \quad \text{P true already and no action made P false}]$$

For holding the gold:

$$\forall\, a, s \;\; Holding(Gold, Result(a, s)) \Leftrightarrow$$
$$[(a = Grab \land AtGold(s))$$
$$\lor\; (Holding(Gold, s) \land a \neq Release)]$$

Making plans

Initial condition in KB:

$At(Agent, [1,1], S_0)$

$At(Gold, [1,2], S_0)$

Query: $Ask(KB, \exists s \;\; Holding(Gold, s))$

i.e., in what situation will I be holding the gold?

Answer: $\{s/Result(Grab, Result(Forward, S_0))\}$

i.e., go forward and then grab the gold

This assumes that the agent is interested in plans starting at S_0 and that S_0 is the only situation described in the KB

Making plans: A better way

Represent plans as action sequences $[a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n]$

$PlanResult(p, s)$ is the result of executing p in s

Then the query $Ask(KB, \exists\, p\;\; Holding(Gold, PlanResult(p, S_0)))$ has the solution $\{p/[Forward, Grab]\}$

Definition of $PlanResult$ in terms of $Result$:

$$\forall\, s\;\; PlanResult([\,], s) = s$$

$$\forall\, a, p, s\;\; PlanResult([a|p], s) = PlanResult(p, Result(a, s))$$

Planning systems are special-purpose reasoners designed to do this type of inference more efficiently than a general-purpose reasoner

Summary

First-order logic:
– objects and relations are semantic primitives
– syntax: constants, functions, predicates, equality, quantifiers

Increased expressive power: sufficient to define wumpus world

Situation calculus:
– conventions for describing actions and change in FOL
– can formulate planning as inference on a situation calculus KB