# Anonymous-Accountable Forums

### Motivation



#### ANONYMITY

Protecting social activists since 73BC.

#### anonymity = bad behavior



# **Security Goals**

- Identity (1) not compromised
  - Unless threshold number of regular users and moderators vote to unmask a user

- Authenticated messages
  - Unless the user sending the message has been unmasked

## **Primitives**

- Public Key Encryption
- Digital Signatures
- Secret Sharing
  - Trivial
  - Threshold (n,k) secret sharing
  - Verifiable secret sharing

# Secret Sharing

- Shamir defines (k,n) threshold secret sharing as dividing some data D into n pieces  $D_1, \ldots, D_n$  such that
- D is easily computable given k or more D<sub>i</sub> pieces
- D is completely undetermined given fewer than k of the D<sub>i</sub> pieces

#### Protocol

- Operations: setup, add user, post, vote to unmask
- Each user has (pk, sk), (pk, sk), and *I*
- Group decides on t<sub>m</sub>, t<sub>u</sub>, and who will be a moderator or a user (m > t<sub>m</sub>, u > t<sub>u</sub>) beforehand

# Protocol - Setup

Each user does the following:

- 1. publish pk, pk
- 2. Encrypt / with pk, and publish
- 3. XOR pk<sub>s</sub> with random string  $k_m$ ; Call the result  $k_{\mu}$
- 4. Distribute  $k_m$  and  $k_u$  among users with verifiable secret sharing (encrypt with recipient's  $pk_e$ ):
  - $(t_m, m)$  secret sharing for moderators
  - $(t_u, u)$  secret sharing for regular users

#### Protocol - Add User

Follow the same procedure as setup, but with only one additional user

Each existing user gives the new user an additional share of their  $k_m$  or  $k_u$ 

#### **Protocol - Post**

#### Poster publishes message signed with sk<sub>s</sub>



#### Protocol - Vote

In order to vote to unmask a user, publish your share of  $k_m$  or  $k_u$  from that user's  $sk_s$ 

If more than  $t_m$  moderators and  $t_u$  users vote to unmask a user, anyone can reconstruct the user's sk<sub>s</sub> and decrypt *I* 

# **Proof Sketch**

- Goal: *I* not compromised unless there are enough votes from both users and moderators
  - Need sk
  - $\circ$  need both k<sub>m</sub> and k<sub>u</sub>
  - need enough votes

(public-key crypto) (XOR) (Secret Sharing)

# **Proof Sketch**

- Goal: posts are authenticated
  - messages can only be forged by negligible probability by one who doesn't have sk<sub>s</sub> (Digital Signature)
  - sk<sub>s</sub> is not made known unless there are enough votes from both regular users and moderators (from previous slide)

### Drawbacks

- Morality assumption
- Threshold proportion shrinks as user population grows
- Need sizeable group to start forum
- What is identity?

Hope is that user/moderator structure helps mitigate the first two drawbacks

#### Sources

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