
Trends in Cyber Physical Systems: A Historical Perspective

Systems that Interact with the Physical World

CSE 40437/60437-Spring 2015 Prof. Dong Wang

Last Lecture



This Lecture

- History and Origin of CPS
- Two Fundamental Challenges of Traditional CPS
- Real-world Examples

History: The Beginnings

- NSF Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems, October 16-17, 2006, Austin, TX.
- National Meeting on Beyond SCADA: Networked Embedded Control for Cyber Physical Systems, November 8-9, 2006, Pittsburgh, PA.
- National Workshop on High-Confidence Software Platforms for Cyber-Physical Systems (HCSP-CPS), November 30 December 1, 2006, Alexandria, VA.
- NSF Industry Round-Table on Cyber-Physical Systems, May 17, 2007, Arlington, VA.
- Joint Workshop On High-Confidence **Medical Devices**, Software, and Systems (HCMDSS) and Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MD PnP) Interoperability, June 25-27, 2007, Boston, MA.
- National Workshop on **Composable Systems** Technologies for High-Confidence Cyber-Physical Systems, July 9-10, 2007, Arlington, VA.
- National Workshop on High-Confidence **Automotive** Cyber-Physical Systems, April 3-4, 2008, Troy, MI.
- CPSWeek, April 21-24, 2008, St. Louis, MO.
- CPS Summit, April 25, 2008, St. Louis, MO: NSF Announces new CPS Initiative
- The First International Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems, International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), June 20, 2008, Beijing, CHINA.
- Workshop on CPS Applications in Smart Power Systems, Raleigh, NC, 2011


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Original Focus: Mission-critical Systems



Building Timely, Predictable, Reliable Systems

Two Classical Challenges

- Establish Functional Correctness: How to build functionally correct systems from possibly flawed components?
- Establish Temporal Correctness: What are the analytic foundation for robust timing guarantees in highly dynamic, time-critical software systems?

Two Classical Challenges

- Establish Functional Correctness: How to build functionally correct systems from possibly flawed components?
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Rate of Innovation and Development Time Issues

- Near the turn of the 20th century products had a 20-30 year life-span before new "versions" were developed
- At present, a product is obsolete in 2-3 years
 - No time to discover and "debug" all possible problems
 - New problems introduced in new versions
 - Component reuse generates additional problems

Software: Increasingly the Primary Cause of System Failure


- Arbitrary component interactions unconstrained by physical laws of nature (algorithms can do anything)
- Fast error propagation (at computing device speed)
- Software that interacts with the physical world is buggy!


Typical Isolation Techniques

- Abstraction
- Separation of concerns

Typical Isolation Techniques

- Abstraction
- Separation of concerns





Abstraction → Solution?

- Complexity
 - → More levels of abstraction
 - → Narrower specialization
 - → More details are "abstracted away"
 - → Myopic view. Less knowledge of possible adverse interactions
 - → More potential for interaction or incompatibility errors

The Curse of Component Re-use The Ariane 5 Explosion

 On June 4, 1996, the maiden flight of the European Ariane 5 launcher crashed about 40 seconds after takeoff (0.5 Billion Dollars)



The Curse of Component Re-use The Ariane 5 Explosion

- On June 4, 1996, the maiden flight of the European Ariane 5 launcher crashed about 40 seconds after takeoff (0.5 Billion Dollars)
- Cause of problem?
 - An inertial reference software component.
 - Not needed during flight. Should be stopped before takeoff but is allowed to operate for up to 50 additional seconds to avoid expensive restarts should countdown be interrupted
 - Component was designed for Ariane 4. Ariane 5 was a faster system. Velocity variable overflowed.
 - Overflow causes an exception that is not caught and crashes the software

Example 1: Interactive Complexity in Distributed Protocols

- Interactive complexity means:
 - Simple individually insignificant failures interact to compound into system failures, or even...
 - Sets of correctly operating components interact to produce a system failure
 - Example:
 - Shortest hop routing
 - Adaptive rate control


Example 1:

- Shortest hop routing
 - Find shorter path (fewer hops that are longer)
- Long wireless hops → poor channel quality
- Adaptive rate control
 - Reduce transmission rate to improve quality
- Reduced transmission rate
 - → Has longer transmission range

Example 2:

Correlated failure modes between "independent components"


- Localization (determining a node's location) fails in a correlated manner with failure to synchronize clocks. Why?
 - Note: None of the two components uses the other



Example 2:


Correlated failure modes between "independent components"

- Localization (determining a node's location) fails in a correlated manner with failure to synchronize clocks. Why?
 - Note: None of the two components uses the other
- Answer: communication problems. Both subsystems rely on distributed protocols



Example 3: More on hidden interactions

- Magnetic tracking system operates perfectly in calm weather but fails under strong wind conditions. Why?
 - Wind should not change magnetic sensor reading




Example 3:

More on hidden interactions

- Magnetic tracking system operates perfectly in calm weather but fails under strong wind conditions. Why?
 - Wind should not change magnetic sensor reading
- Explanation
 - Wind caused node antenna to vibrate
 - Moving (metal) antenna caused a lot of noise on the magnetic sensor
 - Noise filter adapted noise threshold to remove background noise (and in this case the signal too)

Example 4: Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor Failure





March 28, 1979

Example 4: Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor Failure

Core temperature and pressure → Coolant pressure relief valve opens to continue to build up reduce pressure Core overheating triggers emergency Pressure drops. **Valve is stuck open**. shutdown Coolant boils off. Core temperature Valve failure indicator light turns on rises. Reaction resumes. but is **occluded by repair tag** on another device Core is flooded with water Failure to open valves Water at very high Open emergency feed-water pumps temperature oxidizes from emergency tank to cool coolant metal fuel rod Heat exchange stops between coating (rusting) primary and secondary cooling Systems. Primary overheats. Hydrogen is released and Stop secondary coolant flow and turbine eventually leads to explosion

False alarm of minor secondary system coolant leakage through seal

Ensuring Software Correctness

- The physical world has no "reset" button
 - When failures occur, they can be costly!
- Must reduce:
 - Interactive complexity
 - Unexpected interactions between seemingly correct components
 - Coupling
 - Fast propagation of effects of failure to other system components

Designing Complex Systems

(Example: Air-traffic control)

- Reduce interactive complexity
 - Air traffic is restricted to non-intersecting "corridors" that separate flight paths in the sky
- Reduce coupling
 - Separate aircraft by a substantial distance to reduce cascaded failure effects (think: multiplecar pile-ups in freeway accidents)

Interaction Examples

- Function calls
- Resource sharing
 - One module crashes → overwrites memory of another
 → second "unrelated" module crashes (analogy to physical proximity and correlated damage)
 - One module is overloaded → another starves
- Timing and synchronization constraints
 - Precedence constraints (one module must execute before another)
 - Exclusion constraints (cannot operate at the same time)
- Assumptions
 - I thought you submitted our paper?
 - No, I thought you did?

Question: How to Build Reliable Software?

- Common approaches:
 - Tracing, source level debugging
 - Simulation/emulation
 - Log and replay

Candidate Approach: Formal Methods

- Express safety properties (e.g., task A will never miss its deadline)
- Prove that safety properties hold
 - If proof fails, counter example is presented (a sequence of events that leads to failure)

• Problem:

- Proofs require axioms. Axioms may make incorrect assumptions (e.g., circular sensing range)
- Interactions must be explicitly modeled. Failure to model interactions (e.g., between wind and magnetic sensor) may overlook some failure modes.

Living with Buggy Systems

- If errors cannot be avoided (even using formal methods), we must design systems to tolerate them
 - Architectures for "living with bugs"
 - Fast diagnosis and recovery
 - Issues
 - Problem must be observable (or else cannot diagnose)
 - Observation must be in time so that recovery is possible (observing that you forgot your parachute after you jump will not help you)

Simplicity to Conquer Complexity Prof. Lui Sha UIUC

- Elements of a good design
 - Simple safety core
 - Complex enhanced mission functionality
 - Formal proof of core correctness
 - Well formed dependency (core may use but will not depend on any other components)

Sha, Lui. "Using simplicity to control complexity." IEEE Software 18.4 (2001): 20-28.


Diagnosis:

A Development-Time Data Mining Example

- Run system multiple times
- Log all observable interactions (messages exchanged, resources allocated, etc)
- Label execution as "correct" (no observable problems) or "incorrect" (problems observed)
- Separate logs into "good" data set and "bad" data set
- Look for sequences of events in the "good" pile but not the "bad" pile and vice versa


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
Real-Time Workload

- Job (unit of work)
 - a computation, a file read, a message transmission, etc
- Attributes
 - Resources required to make progress



Real-Time Task

- Task: a sequence of similar jobs
 - Periodic task (p,e)
 - Its jobs repeat regularly
 - Period p = inter-release time (0 < p)
 - Execution time e = maximum execution time (0 < e < p)
 - Utilization U = e/p



Deadlines: Hard vs. Soft

Hard deadline


- Disastrous or very serious consequences may occur if the deadline is missed
- Validation is essential : can all the deadlines be met, even under worst-case scenario?
- Deterministic guarantees

Soft deadline

- Ideally, the deadline should be met for maximum performance. The performance degrades in case of deadline misses.
- Best effort approaches / statistical guarantees


Schedulability

 Property indicating whether a real-time system (a set of real-time tasks) can meet their deadlines




Real-Time Scheduling

- Determines the order of real-time task executions
- Static-priority scheduling
- Dynamic-priority scheduling




RM (Rate Monotonic)

- Optimal static-priority scheduling
- It assigns priority according to period
- A task with a shorter period has a higher priority
- Executes a job with the shortest period




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Executes a job with the shortest period




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
Response Time

- Response time
 - Duration from released time to finish time



Response Time

- Response time
 - Duration from released time to finish time




Response Time

Response Time (r_i) [Audsley et al., 1993]

$$r_i = e_i + \sum_{T_k \in HP(T_i)} \left\lceil \frac{r_i}{p_k} \right\rceil \cdot e_k$$

• HP(T_i): a set of higher-priority tasks than T_i



RM - Schedulability Analysis

Real-time system is schedulable under RM
if and only if r_i ≤ p_i for all task T_i(p_i,e_i)

Joseph & Pandya,

"Finding response times in a real-time system",

The Computer Journal, 1986.

• Real-time system is schedulable under RM if $\sum U_i \le n (2^{1/n}-1)$

Liu & Layland,

"Scheduling algorithms for multi-programming in a hard-real-time environment", Journal of ACM, 1973.

- Real-time system is schedulable under RM if $\sum U_i \le n \ (2^{1/n}-1)$
- Example: $T_1(4,1)$, $T_2(5,1)$, $T_3(10,1)$,

$$\sum U_i = 1/4 + 1/5 + 1/10$$
$$= 0.55$$
$$3 (2^{1/3}-1) \approx 0.78$$

Thus, $\{T_1, T_2, T_3\}$ is schedulable under RM.

- Real-time system is schedulable under RM if $\sum U_i \le n (2^{1/n}-1)$
- Example: $T_1(4,1)$, $T_2(5,2)$, $T_3(7,2)$,

$$\sum U_i = 1/4 + 2/5 + 2/7$$

$$\approx 0.94$$

$$3 (2^{1/3}-1) \approx 0.78$$

Thus, $\{T_1, T_2, T_3\}$ is NOT schedulable under RM.

• Real-time system is schedulable under RM if $\sum U_i \le n (2^{1/n}-1)$

• Example: $T_1(4,1)$, $T_2(5,2)$, $T_3(10,2)$,


$$\sum U_i = 1/4 + 2/5 + 2/10$$
$$= 0.85$$
$$3 (2^{1/3}-1) \approx 0.78$$

However, $\{T_1, T_2, T_3\}$ is still schedulable under RM (as we just showed) even their total utilization is higher than the bound!


- Real-time system is schedulable under RM if (but not only if) ∑U_i ≤ n (2^{1/n}-1)
- The above condition is only a sufficient but not necessary condition!
 - We only know tasks with utilization lower than the bound is guaranteed to be schedulable under RM.
 - We know nothing about tasks with higher utilization!

• Real-time system is schedulable under RM if $\sum U_i \le n \ (2^{1/n}-1)$


RM Utilization Bounds




- Optimal dynamic priority scheduling
- A task with a shorter deadline has a higher priority
- Executes a job with the earliest deadline




Executes a job with the earliest deadline




Executes a job with the earliest deadline



Executes a job with the earliest deadline



- Optimal scheduling algorithm
 - if there is a schedule for a set of real-time tasks,
 EDF can schedule it.



EDF — Utilization Bound

 Real-time system is schedulable under EDF if and only if

$$\sum U_i \leq 1$$


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
EDF – Overload Conditions


- Domino effect during overload conditions
 - Example: $T_1(4,3)$, $T_2(5,3)$, $T_3(6,3)$, $T_4(7,3)$

Deadline Miss!



Better schedules:





RM vs. EDF

- Rate Monotonic
 - Simpler implementation, even in systems without explicit support for timing constraints (periods, deadlines)
 - Predictability for the highest priority tasks
- EDF
 - Full processor utilization
 - Misbehavior during overload conditions
- For more details: Buttazzo, "Rate monotonic vs. EDF: Judgement Day", EMSOFT 2003.

Real-world Example: What Happens on Mars?





Prof. Lui Sha, CS, UIUC

Priority Inheritance and Priority Ceiling Protocols


L. Sha, R. Rajkumar, and J. P. Lehoczky, "Priority Inheritance Protocols: An Approach to Real-Time Synchronization", IEEE Transactions on Computers, Vol. 39, No. 9, Sept. 1990.

The Problem


- Tasks have synchronization constraints
 - Semaphores protect critical sections
- Blocking can cause a higher-priority task to wait on an lower-priority one to unlock the resource
 - Problem: In all previous scheduling examples, we assumed that a task can only wait for higher priority tasks not lower-priority tasks

Mutual Exclusion Constraints

 Tasks that lock/unlock the same semaphore are said to have a mutual exclusion constraint



 Locks and priorities may be at odds. Locking results in priority inversion.



Low-priority Task

 Locks and priorities may be at odds. Locking results in priority inversion.

Attempt to Lock S but results in blocking


High-priority Task

Lock S

Preempt Priority Inversion

Low-priority Task

How to account for priority inversion?



 What is the problem of this scheme? Can the high-priority task gets delayed unboundedly?

Attempt to Lock S but results in blocking

High-priority Task

Lock S Preempt Priority Inversion


Low-priority Task

Unlock S

Unbounded Priority Inversion

 Consider the following: a series of intermediate priority tasks is delaying a higher-priority one

Attempt to Lock S but results in blocking




Unbounded Priority Inversion

 Consider the following: a series of intermediate priority tasks is delaying a higher-priority one

Attempt to Lock S but results in blocking High-priority Task **ded** priority inversion The root cause of the Mars Pathfinder Intermediate-priority restarting problem! Pree. pt Low-priority Task Unlock S


Unbounded Priority Inversion

How to prevent unbounded priority inversion?



Priority Inheritance Protocol


 Let a task inherit the priority of any higher priority task it is blocking




Deadlocks in PIP

$$J_{I} = \{..., P(S_{2})..., P(S_{1})..., V(S_{1})..., V(S_{2}),...\}$$

$$J_{2} = \{..., P(S_{1})..., P(S_{2})..., V(S_{2})..., V(S_{1}),...\}$$
crossing nested semaphores



Blocking Chains in PIP



Priority Ceiling Protocol (PCP)

Goals:


- Solve problems of PIP.
 - Prevent deadlocks and blocking chains


• Basic idea:

- Priority ceiling of a semaphore:
 - The priority of the highest priority task that may use the semaphore
- Additional condition for allowing a job J to start a new critical section
 - only if J's priority is higher than all priority ceilings of all the semaphores locked by jobs other than J.

Examples for PCP (1/2)


Prevent deadlocks








Further Reading


 Buttazzo, Giorgio C. Hard real-time computing systems: predictable scheduling algorithms and applications. Vol. 24. Springer, 2011.

















Body-Area Networks





Micro- and Nanosensors, Biochips

Bio-feedback Sensors



Point of Care **Devices**



Wearable Activity and Biometric Monitoring



Smart Spaces




Implanted Sensors Insulin pumps, pacemakers, glucose monitors, ...


Transparent **Testing**

Crowd-sensing Browsing the Physical World


Feng Zhao http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/senseweb/





Military Situation Awareness Applications











Publication Venues

- Cyber-physical systems
 - International conference on cyber-physical systems (ICCPS)
 - CPSWeek (http://www.cpsweek.org)
- Real-time systems
 - IEEE Real-time systems symposium (IEEE RTSS)
 - IEEE Real-time applications symposium (IEEE RTAS)
 - Springer Journal on Real-time Systems
- Embedded systems
 - International conference on embedded software (EmSoft)
 - ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (ACM TECS)
- Networked sensing
 - ACM Sensys (http://sensys.acm.org/2014/index.html)
 - ACM/IEEE IPSN (http://ipsn.acm.org/2015/)
 - ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (ACM ToSN)

Publication Venues (Cont.)

- Data Analytics, Mining and Processing
 - ACM KDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (http://www.kdd.org/kdd2015/)
 - IEEE International Conference on Data Mining (ICDE) (http://icdm2014.sfu.ca/home.html)
 - ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining (http://www.wsdm-conference.org/2015/)
 - International World Wide Web Conference (WWW) (http://www.www2015.it/)
 - IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering (TKDE)
 (http://www.computer.org/portal/web/tkde)

Education Venues

- Nano-Tera/Artist Summer School on Embedded System Design
 - http://artist-summer-school.epfl.ch/
- Georgia Tech Summer School on Cyber Physical Systems
 - http://users.ece.gatech.edu/~magnus/CPSschool.html

The CPS Research Landscape (An Incomplete List, Alphabetic)

- Berkeley (architecture, control, automotive, sensor networks, ...):
 - http://chess.eecs.berkeley.edu/
- CMU (real-time, automotive, ...):
 - http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~raj/
- Notre Dame (social sensing, CPS in social space)
 - http://www3.nd.edu/~dwang5/
- UIUC (avionics, human-centric, medical, ...)
 - http://publish.illinois.edu/cpsintegrationlab/
- U. of Pennsylvania (composability, medical, ...)
 - http://precise.seas.upenn.edu/
- University of Virginia (sensor networks, real-time, ...)
 - http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~stankovic/rts.html
- Vanderbilt (composition, control, ...)
 - http://www.isis.vanderbilt.edu/research/NES

Pointers and Readings

• "Opportunities and Obligations for Physical Computing Systems", *Computer*, Volume 38, Issue 11, November 2005, pages 23-31. (Report produced by a Workshop at the IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium, December 2003).

http://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/222/

 "High Confidence Medical Device Software and Systems (HCMDSS)" Workshop, June 2 - 3, 2005, Philadelphia, PA.

http://rtg.cis.upenn.edu/hcmdss/index.php3

 National Workshop on "Aviation Software Systems: Design for Certifiably Dependable Systems", October 5-6, 2006, Alexandria, TX

http://chess.eecs.berkeley.edu/hcssas/index.html

- NSF Workshop on "Cyber-Physical Systems", October 16-17, 2006, Austin, TX. http://varma.ece.cmu.edu/CPS
- National Workshop on "High-Confidence Software Platforms for Cyber-Physical Systems (HCSP-CPS)", November 30 December 1, 2006, Alexandria, VA.

http://www.isis.vanderbilt.edu/HCSP-CPS/

Pointers and Readings

- "Joint Workshop On High-Confidence Medical Devices, Software, and Systems (HCMDSS) and Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MD PnP) Interoperability", June 25-27, 2007, Boston, MA. http://rtq.cis.upenn.edu/hcmdss07/index.php3
- National Workshop on "Composable and Systems Technologies for High-Confidence Cyber-Physical Systems", July 9-10, 2007, Arlington, VA.

http://www.isis.vanderbilt.edu/CST-HCCPS/

 National Workshop on "High-Confidence Automotive Cyber-Physical Systems", Apr 3-4, 2008, Troy, MI.

http://varma.ece.cmu.edu/Auto-CPS/

CPSWeek, 2008-present

http://www.cpsweek.org/

CPS Summit, April 25, 2008, St. Louis, MO, USA.

http://varma.ece.cmu.edu/Summit

• National Workshop on "Research on Transportation Cyber-Physical Systems: Automotive, Aviation, and Rail", November 18-20, 2008, Washington, DC (USA).

http://www.ee.washington.edu/research/nsl/aar-cps