


(The journey towards)

Functional Controllable Homomorphic Encryption

Ameer Mohammed
Soheil Nemati

Motivation




Refresher:


FE vs. FHE

Functional Encryption	Fully Homomorphic Encryption
$(PK, MSK) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$	$(PK, SK) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$
$SK_f \leftarrow \text{Keygen}(MSK, f)$	
$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(MPK, x)$	$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(MPK, x)$
	$c' \leftarrow \text{Eval}(PK, g, c_1, \dots, c_n)$
$f(x) \leftarrow \text{Dec}(SK_f, c)$	$g(x_1, \dots, x_n) \leftarrow \text{Dec}(SK, c')$


1st Try: Using FE + FHE




2nd Try: Using FE(FHE)



3rd Try: Using FE(FHE)




Next Step?



Can we ***even*** achieve Functional
Encryption that is also **fully**
homomorphic?

Functional Encryption Security Game



Secure if
$$\Pr[b' = b] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\kappa)$$

Func. Fully HE Security Game

Adv

Chall

PK

←

f

→

←

SK_f

$SK_f = \text{Keygen}(MSK, f)$

x^0, x^1

→

$\text{Enc}(PK, x^b)$

←

→

Output b'

$f(x^0) = f(x^1)$




There exists g such that
 $f(g(x^0)) \neq f(g(x^1))$

What happens when we allow
Adv to use FHE. $\text{Eval}(g, c)$?


Secure if

$$\Pr[b' = b] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\kappa)$$


Motivation (Revisited)




Overview of Techniques




Func. Cont. HE



What is Token-based Obfuscation?



Impossible
[BGI+01]



Possible
[GKP+13]


What is Controlled Homomorphic Encryption?

Fully Homomorphic Encryption	Controlled Homomorphic Encryption
$(PK, SK) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n)$	$(MSK, PK) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n)$
$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(PK, x)$	$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(PK, x)$
	$\text{Eval}K_g \leftarrow \text{EvalKeygen}(MSK, g)$
$c' \leftarrow \text{Eval}(PK, g, c)$	$c' \leftarrow \text{HEval}(PK, \text{Eval}K_g, c)$
$g(x) \leftarrow \text{Dec}(SK, c')$	$g(x) \leftarrow \text{Dec}(MSK, c')$

Controlled HE Security Game


Adv

Chall



Secure if
$$\Pr[b' = b] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\kappa)$$


Constructing Func. Cont. HE




Funct. Cont. HE Syntax

Controlled HE	Functional Encryption	Funct. Cont. HE
$(PK, MSK) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n)$	$(PK, MSK) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n)$	$(PK, MSK) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n)$
$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(PK, x)$	$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(PK, x)$	$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(PK, x)$
$EvalK_g \leftarrow \text{EvalKGen}(MSK, g)$		$EvalK_g \leftarrow \text{EvalKGen}(MSK, g)$
	$SK_f \leftarrow \text{Keygen}(MSK, f)$	$SK_f \leftarrow \text{Keygen}(MSK, f)$
$c' \leftarrow \text{HEval}(PK, EK_g, c)$		$c' \leftarrow \text{HEval}(PK, EvalK_g, c)$
$g(x) \leftarrow \text{Dec}(MSK, c')$	$f(x) \leftarrow \text{Dec}(SK_f, c)$	$f(g(x)) \leftarrow \text{Dec}(SK_f, c')$

Functional Encryption Security Game




Func. **Cont.** HE Security Game




Weak Func. Cont. HE Security Game

Adv


Chall




Controllable HE and Token-based Obfuscation → Func. Cont. HE



Controllable HE and Token-based Obfuscation → Func. Cont. HE




Sketch of Proof



Related Problems to Func. Cont. HE

- Multi-hop Homomorphism
 - Evaluated ciphertexts can be re-evaluated
 - $f\left(g\left(g(g(x))\right)\right)$
- Functional Composability
 - Compose multiple functions
 - $f(g_3(g_2(g_1(x))))$
- Multi-input Homomorphism
 - $f(g(x_1, \dots, x_n))$


Next: Controlled Homomorphism



Controlled Homomorphic Syntax

Controlled Homomorphic Encryption	Fully Homomorphic Encryption
$(MSK, PK) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n)$	$(PK, SK) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n)$
$EvalK_g \leftarrow \text{EvalKeygen}(MSK, g)$	
$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(PK, x)$	$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(PK, x)$
$c' \leftarrow \text{HEval}(PK, \textcolor{red}{E}K_g, c)$	$c' \leftarrow \text{Eval}(PK, g, c)$
$g(x) \leftarrow \text{Dec}(MSK, c')$	$g(x) \leftarrow \text{Dec}(SK, c')$

Controlled HE Security Game



Secure if

$$\Pr[C = \text{Enc}(f(x_b))] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\kappa)$$

Trivial construction

PKE + Sign $\rightarrow$ CHE

CHE.Setup $\rightarrow Pk = ek, \quad MSK = (dk, sk)$

CHE.KeyGen(*MSK*, *C*) $\rightarrow EvalK_f = (f, \text{Sign}(sk, f))$

CHE.Enc(*Pk*, *M*) $\rightarrow C = \text{Enc}_{ek}(M)$

CHE.HEval(*Ct*, *EK_c*) $\rightarrow (C, EvalK_f) = (C, (f, \text{Sign}(sk, f)))$

CHE.Dec(*dk*, *Ct*) $\rightarrow PKE.\text{Dec}_{dk}(C)$

$$FE + PRF \rightarrow CHE$$

- Two components:

- Functional Encryption

$$FE = (FE.\text{Setup}, FE.\text{Enc}, FE.\text{KeyGen}, FE.\text{Eval})$$

- Pseudorandom Function

$$\mathcal{F} = \{F(.,.)\}$$

High-level Idea

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| • $\text{CHE.Setup}(1^n) \rightarrow (Pk, MSK)$ | FE.Setup |
| • $\text{CHE.Enc}(Pk, M) \rightarrow C$ | FE.Enc |
| • $\text{CHE.KeyGen}(MSK, f) \rightarrow \text{EvalK}_f$ | FE.Keygen |
| • $\text{CHE.HEval}(Pk, f, EK_f) \rightarrow C'$ | FE.Dec |
| • $\text{CHE.Dec}(MSK, C') \rightarrow f(M)$ | |

High-level Idea

- $\text{CHE.Setup}(1^n) \rightarrow (Pk, MSK)$
- $\text{CHE.Enc}(Pk, M) \rightarrow C$
- **$\text{CHE.KeyGen}(MSK, f) \rightarrow EvalK_f$**  $f'(M) = \text{FE.Enc}_{pk}(f(M))$
- $\text{CHE.HEval}(Pk, f, EK_f) \rightarrow C'$  $C' = \text{FE.Enc}(f(M))$
- $\text{CHE.Dec}(MSK, C') \rightarrow f(M)$

Actual Construction


- $\text{CHE.Setup} \begin{cases} Pk = FE.PK \\ MSK = FE.MSK \end{cases}$
- $\text{CHE.Enc}(M) = \text{FE.Enc}(M, r)$
- $\text{CHE.KeyGen}(MSK, f) \begin{cases} f'(M, r) = \text{FE.Enc}(FE.Pk, (\mathbf{C}(M)); \mathbf{F}(r, f)) \\ EvalK_f = \text{FE.KeyGen}(f') \end{cases}$
- $\text{CHE.HEval}(C, EvalK_f) = \text{FE.Dec}(C, EvalK_f)$
- $\text{CHE.Dec}(MSK, C) = \text{FE.Dec}(C, EvalK_{Id})$

Thank you!

Questions?

Suggestions?


Garbling Mechanisms



Sender:

$(\tilde{C}, sk) \leftarrow \mathbf{GC}(C)$
 $\tilde{x} \leftarrow \mathbf{GI}(sk, x)$


$(\tilde{C}, \tilde{x})$



Evaluator:



$\tilde{C}(\tilde{x}) \leftarrow \mathbf{GE}(\tilde{C}, \tilde{x})$

Reusable Garbled Circuit



Sender:

$$(\tilde{C}, sk) \leftarrow \mathbf{GC}(C)$$
$$\tilde{x}_i \leftarrow \mathbf{GI}(sk, x_i)$$



Evaluator:

$$\tilde{C}(\tilde{x}) \leftarrow \mathbf{GE}(\tilde{C}, \tilde{x})$$

FE $\rightarrow$ Reusable Garbled Circuits

- **$GC(C)$:**
 - $(MSK, PK) \leftarrow \text{FE. Setup}$
 - $k \leftarrow \text{Sym. Setup}$
 - $\tilde{C} \leftarrow \text{FE. Keygen}(MSK, U_E)$
 - Output $(\tilde{C}, k)$
- **$GI(k, x)$:** $\tilde{x} \leftarrow \text{FE. Enc}(PK, (k, x))$
- **$GE(\tilde{C}, \tilde{x})$:** $\text{FE. Dec}(\tilde{C}, \tilde{x}) = \tilde{C}(k, x) = U_E(k, x) = C(x)$

$$U_E(k, x)$$

$$C \leftarrow \text{Sym. Dec}(k, E)$$
$$\text{Output } C(x)$$

Sketch of Proof

