

18-600 Foundations of Computer Systems

Lecture 6:

"Machine-Level Programming III: Loops, Procedures, the Stack, and More"

September 18, 2017

- Required Reading Assignment:
 - Chapter 3 of CS:APP (3rd edition) by Randy Bryant & Dave O'Hallaron
- Assignments for This Week:
 - ❖ Lab 2



Today

- Control
 - **Conditional Branches**
 - Switch Statements
- Procedures
 - Stack Structure
 - Passing control & data
 - Managing local data
 - Illustration of Recursion
- Buffer Overflow (Attacks)
- SSE, SIMD, FP

Jumping

- jX Instructions
 - Jump to different part of code depending on condition codes

jX	Condition	Description
jmp	1	Unconditional
je	ZF	Equal / Zero
jne	$\sim ZF$	Not Equal / Not Zero
js	SF	Negative
jns	$\sim SF$	Nonnegative
jg	$\sim (SF \wedge OF) \ \& \ \sim ZF$	Greater (Signed)
jge	$\sim (SF \wedge OF)$	Greater or Equal (Signed)
jl	$(SF \wedge OF)$	Less (Signed)
jle	$(SF \wedge OF) \ \ ZF$	Less or Equal (Signed)
ja	$\sim CF \ \& \ \sim ZF$	Above (unsigned)
jb	CF	Below (unsigned)

Conditional Branch Example (Using Branch)

- Generation

```
shark> gcc -Og -S -fno-if-conversion control.c
```

```
long absdiff
(long x, long y)
{
    long result;
    if (x > y)
        result = x-y;
    else
        result = y-x;
    return result;
}
```

```
absdiff:
    cmpq    %rsi, %rdi    # x:y
    jle    .L4
    movq    %rdi, %rax
    subq    %rsi, %rax
    ret
.L4:      # x <= y
    movq    %rsi, %rax
    subq    %rdi, %rax
    ret
```

Register	Use(s)
%rdi	Argument x
%rsi	Argument y
%rax	Return value

General Conditional Expression Translation (Using Branches)

C Code

```
val = Test ? Then_Expr : Else_Expr;
```

```
val = x > y ? x - y : y - x;
```

Goto Version

```
n_test = !Test;  
if (n_test) goto Else;  
val = Then_Expr;  
goto Done;  
Else:  
    val = Else_Expr;  
Done:  
    . . .
```

- Create separate code regions for then & else expressions
- Execute appropriate one

Using Conditional Moves

- Conditional Move Instructions
 - Instruction supports:
if (Test) Dest \leftarrow Src
 - Supported in post-1995 x86 processors
 - GCC tries to use them
 - But, only when known to be safe
- Why?
 - Branches are very disruptive to instruction flow through pipelines
 - Conditional moves do not require control transfer
- Only make sense when both conditional calculations are simple and safe

C Code

```
val = Test  
  ? Then_Expr  
  : Else_Expr ;
```

Goto Version

```
result = Then_Expr ;  
eval = Else_Expr ;  
nt = !Test ;  
if (nt) result = eval ;  
return result ;
```

Conditional Move Example

```

long absdiff
(long x, long y)
{
    long result;
    if (x > y)
        result = x-y;
    else
        result = y-x;
    return result;
}

```

Register	Use(s)
%rdi	Argument x
%rsi	Argument y
%rax	Return value

```

absdiff:
movq    %rdi, %rax    # x
subq    %rsi, %rax    # result = x-y
movq    %rsi, %rdx
subq    %rdi, %rdx    # eval = y-x
cmpq    %rsi, %rdi    # x:y
cmovle  %rdx, %rax    # if <=, result = eval
ret

```


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"While" Translation #1 (Jump to Middle)


- "Jump-to-middle" translation; Used with `-Og`

```
while (Test)
    Body
```



```
goto test;
loop:
    Body
test:
    if (Test)
        goto loop;
done:
```

```
long pcount_while
(unsigned long x) {
    long result = 0;
    while (x) {
        result += x & 0x1;
        x >>= 1;
    }
    return result;
}
```



```
long pcount_goto_jtm
(unsigned long x) {
    long result = 0;
    goto test;
loop:
    result += x & 0x1;
    x >>= 1;
test:
    if(x) goto loop;
    return result;
}
```

"While" Translation #2 (Do while)


- "Do-while" conversion; Used with `-O1`

```
while (Test)
    Body
```



```
if (!Test)
    goto done;
loop:
    Body
    if (Test)
        goto loop;
done:
```

```
long pcount_while
(unsigned long x) {
    long result = 0;
    while (x) {
        result += x & 0x1;
        x >>= 1;
    }
    return result;
}
```




```
long pcount_goto_dw
(unsigned long x) {
    long result = 0;
    if (!x) goto done;
loop:
    result += x & 0x1;
    x >>= 1;
    if(x) goto loop;
done:
    return result;
}
```

"For" Loop → While Loop

General Form

```
for (Init; Test; Update )  
    Body
```




While Version

```
Init ;  
while (Test) {  
    Body  
    Update ;  
}
```

"For" Loop → While Loop (example)

```
#define WSIZE 8*sizeof(int)
long pcount_for
(unsigned long x)
{
    size_t i;
    long result = 0;
    for (i = 0; i < WSIZE; i++)
    {
        unsigned bit =
            (x >> i) & 0x1;
        result += bit;
    }
    return result;
}
```



```
long pcount_for_while
(unsigned long x)
{
    size_t i;
    long result = 0;
    i = 0;
    while (i < WSIZE)
    {
        unsigned bit =
            (x >> i) & 0x1;
        result += bit;
        i++;
    }
    return result;
}
```

"For" Loop Do-While Conversion

```

long pcount_for
(unsigned long x)
{
    size_t i;
    long result = 0;
    for (i = 0; i < WSIZE; i++)
    {
        unsigned bit =
            (x >> i) & 0x1;
        result += bit;
    }
    return result;
}

```

- Initial test can be optimized away

```

long pcount_for_goto_dw
(unsigned long x) {
    size_t i;
    long result = 0;
    i = 0;
    if (!(i < WSIZE))
    goto done;
loop:
    {
        unsigned bit =
            (x >> i) & 0x1;
        result += bit;
    }
    i++;
    if (i < WSIZE)
        goto loop;
done:
    return result;
}

```

Init

~~!Test~~

Body

Update

Test

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Switch Statement Example

```
long switch_eg
(long x, long y, long z)
{
    long w = 1;
    switch(x) {
    case 1:
        w = y*z;
        break;
    case 2:
        w = y/z;
        /* Fall Through */
    case 3:
        w += z;
        break;
    case 5:
    case 6:
        w -= z;
        break;
    default:
        w = 2;
    }
    return w;
}
```

- Multiple case labels
 - Here: 5 & 6
- Fall through cases
 - Here: 2
- Missing cases
 - Here: 4

Jump Table Structure

Switch Form

```
switch (x) {
  case val_0:
    Block 0
  case val_1:
    Block 1
    • • •
  case val_n-1:
    Block n-1
}
```

Translation (Extended C)

```
goto *JTab[x];
```

Jump Table

jtab:	Targ0
	Targ1
	Targ2
	•
	•
	•
	Targn-1

Jump Targets

Targ0:

Code Block
0

Targ1:

Code Block
1

Targ2:

Code Block
2

•

•

•

Targn-1:

Code Block
n-1

Switch Statement Example

```
long switch_eg(long x, long y, long z)
{
    long w = 1;
    switch(x) {
        . . .
    }
    return w;
}
```

Setup:

```
switch_eg:
    movq    %rdx, %rcx
    cmpq    $6, %rdi    # x:6
    ja     .L8          # Use default
    jmp     *.L4(, %rdi, 8)
```

*Indirect
jump*

What range of values takes default?

Register	Use(s)
%rdi	Argument x
%rsi	Argument y
%rdx	Argument z
%rax	Return value

Jump table

```
.section    .rodata
    .align 8
.L4:
    .quad   .L8    # x = 0
    .quad   .L3    # x = 1
    .quad   .L5    # x = 2
    .quad   .L9    # x = 3
    .quad   .L8    # x = 4
    .quad   .L7    # x = 5
    .quad   .L7    # x = 6
```

Assembly Setup Explanation

- Table Structure
 - Each target requires 8 bytes
 - Base address at `.L4`
- Jumping
 - **Direct:** `jmp .L8`
 - Jump target is denoted by label `.L8`
 - **Indirect:** `jmp *.L4(, %rdi, 8)`
 - Start of jump table: `.L4`
 - Must scale by factor of 8 (addresses are 8 bytes)
 - Fetch target from effective Address `.L4 + x*8`
 - Only for $0 \leq x \leq 6$

Jump table

```
.section      .rodata
    .align 8
.L4:
    .quad     .L8    # x = 0
    .quad     .L3    # x = 1
    .quad     .L5    # x = 2
    .quad     .L9    # x = 3
    .quad     .L8    # x = 4
    .quad     .L7    # x = 5
    .quad     .L7    # x = 6
```

Jump Table

```
.section .rodata
.align 8
.L4:
.quad .L8 # x = 0
.quad .L3 # x = 1
.quad .L5 # x = 2
.quad .L9 # x = 3
.quad .L8 # x = 4
.quad .L7 # x = 5
.quad .L7 # x = 6
```


```
switch(x) {
case 1: // .L3
    w = y*z;
    break;
case 2: // .L5
    w = y/z;
    /* Fall Through */
case 3: // .L9
    w += z;
    break;
case 5:
case 6: // .L7
    w -= z;
    break;
default: // .L8
    w = 2;
}
```

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
x86-64 Stack

- Region of memory managed with stack discipline
- Grows toward lower addresses
- Register `%rsp` contains lowest stack address
 - address of "top" element



x86-64 Stack: Push


- **pushq Src**
 - Fetch operand at *Src*
 - Decrement `%rsp` by 8
 - Write operand at address given by `%rsp`



x86-64 Stack: Pop

■ `popq Dest`

- Read value at address given by `%rsp`
- Increment `%rsp` by 8
- Store value at `Dest` (must be register)



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Code Examples

```
void multstore
(long x, long y, long *dest) {
    long t = mult2(x, y);
    *dest = t;
}
```

```
00000000000400540 <multstore>:
400540: push    %rbx           # Save %rbx
400541: mov     %rdx,%rbx      # Save dest
400544: callq  400550 <mult2>  # mult2(x,y)
400549: mov     %rax,(%rbx)    # Save at dest
40054c: pop     %rbx           # Restore %rbx
40054d: retq                    # Return
```

```
long mult2
(long a, long b)
{
    long s = a * b;
    return s;
}
```

```
00000000000400550 <mult2>:
400550: mov     %rdi,%rax      # a
400553: imul   %rsi,%rax      # a * b
400557: retq                    # Return
```

Procedure Control Flow

- Use stack to support procedure call and return
- **Procedure call: `call label`**
 - Push return address on stack
 - Jump to *label*
- Return address:
 - Address of the next instruction right after call
 - Example from disassembly
- **Procedure return: `ret`**
 - Pop address from stack
 - Jump to address

Control Flow Example

```


00000000000400540 <multstore>:
•
•
400544: callq  400550 <mult2>
400549: mov   %rax, (%rbx)
•
•

```

```

00000000000400550 <mult2>:
400550: mov   %rdi, %rax
•
•
400557: retq

```



Control Flow Example

```

00000000000400540 <multstore>:
.
.
400544: callq  400550 <mult2>
400549: mov   %rax, (%rbx)
.
.

```

```

00000000000400550 <mult2>:
400550: mov   %rdi, %rax
.
.
400557: retq

```

0x130

0x128

0x120

0x118 0x400549

%rsp 0x118

%rip 0x400550

Control Flow Example

```
00000000000400540 <multstore>:
•
•
400544: callq 400550 <mult2>
400549: mov  %rax, (%rbx)
•
•
```

```
00000000000400550 <mult2>:
400550: mov  %rdi, %rax
•
•
400557: retq
```

0x130

0x128

0x120

0x118

0x400549

%rsp

0x118

%rip

0x400557

Control Flow Example

```
00000000000400540 <multstore>:
.
.
400544: callq 400550 <mult2>
400549: mov  %rax, (%rbx)
.
.
```

```
00000000000400550 <mult2>:
400550: mov  %rdi, %rax
.
.
400557: retq
```


0x130

0x128

0x120

%rsp

%rip




0x120

0x400549

Procedure Data Flow

Registers


- First 6 arguments



- Return value



Stack



- Only allocate stack space when needed

Data Flow Examples

```
void multstore
(long x, long y, long *dest) {
    long t = mult2(x, y);
    *dest = t;
}
```

```
0000000000400540 <multstore>:
    # x in %rdi, y in %rsi, dest in %rdx
    ...
400541: mov     %rdx,%rbx        # Save dest
400544: callq  400550 <mult2>    # mult2(x,y)
    # t in %rax
400549: mov     %rax,(%rbx)      # Save at dest
    ...
```

```
long mult2
(long a, long b)
{
    long s = a * b;
    return s;
}
```


```
0000000000400550 <mult2>:
    # a in %rdi, b in %rsi
400550: mov     %rdi,%rax        # a
400553: imul   %rsi,%rax        # a * b
    # s in %rax
400557: retq                               # Return
```

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Stack Frames

- Contents
 - Return information
 - Local storage (if needed)
 - Temporary space (if needed)
- Management
 - Space allocated when enter procedure
 - "Set-up" code
 - Includes push by `call` instruction
 - Deallocated when return
 - "Finish" code
 - Includes pop by `ret` instruction



Example: `incr`

```
long incr(long *p, long val) {
    long x = *p;
    long y = x + val;
    *p = y;
    return x;
}
```


```
incr:
    movq    (%rdi), %rax
    addq    %rax, %rsi
    movq    %rsi, (%rdi)
    ret
```

Register	Use(s)
<code>%rdi</code>	Argument <code>p</code>
<code>%rsi</code>	Argument <code>val</code> , <code>y</code>
<code>%rax</code>	<code>x</code> , Return value

Example: Calling `incr` #1


```
long call_incr() {
    long v1 = 15213;
    long v2 = incr(&v1, 3000);
    return v1+v2;
}
```

Initial Stack Structure



```
call_incr:
    subq    $16, %rsp
    movq    $15213, 8(%rsp)
    movl    $3000, %esi
    leaq    8(%rsp), %rdi
    call    incr
    addq    8(%rsp), %rax
    addq    $16, %rsp
    ret
```

Resulting Stack Structure




Example: Calling `incr` #2

```
long call_incr() {
    long v1 = 15213;
    long v2 = incr(&v1, 3000);
    return v1+v2;
}
```

```
call_incr:
    subq    $16, %rsp
    movq    $15213, 8(%rsp)
    movl    $3000, %esi
    leaq    8(%rsp), %rdi
    call    incr
    addq    8(%rsp), %rax
    addq    $16, %rsp
    ret
```

Stack Structure




Register	Use(s)
%rdi	&v1
%rsi	3000

Example: Calling `incr` #3

```
long call_incr() {
    long v1 = 15213;
    long v2 = incr(&v1, 3000);
    return v1+v2;
}
```


```
call_incr:
    subq    $16, %rsp
    movq    $15213, 8(%rsp)
    movl    $3000, %esi
    leaq    8(%rsp), %rdi
    call   incr
    addq    8(%rsp), %rax
    addq    $16, %rsp
    ret
```

Stack Structure



Register	Use(s)
<code>%rax</code>	Return value

Updated Stack Structure




Example: Calling `incr` #4

```
long call_incr() {
    long v1 = 15213;
    long v2 = incr(&v1, 3000);
    return v1+v2;
}
```


```
call_incr:
    subq    $16, %rsp
    movq    $15213, 8(%rsp)
    movl    $3000, %esi
    leaq    8(%rsp), %rdi
    call   incr
    addq    8(%rsp), %rax
    addq    $16, %rsp
    ret
```

Updated Stack Structure



Register	Use(s)
<code>%rax</code>	Return value

Final Stack Structure



Register Saving Conventions

- When procedure **yoo** calls **who**:
 - **yoo** is the *caller*; **who** is the *callee*
- Can register be used for temporary storage?

```
yoo:
  . . .
  movq $15213, %rdx
  call who
  addq %rdx, %rax
  . . .
  ret
```

```
who:
  . . .
  subq $18213, %rdx
  . . .
  ret
```

- Contents of register `%rdx` overwritten by **who**. This could be trouble.

■ Conventions

- *“Caller Saved”*: Caller saves temporary values in its frame before the call
- *“Callee Saved”*: Callee saves temporary values in its frame before using, and restores them before returning to caller

x86-64 Linux Register Usage #1

- **%rax**
 - Return value
 - Also caller-saved
 - Can be modified by procedure
- **%rdi, ..., %r9**
 - Arguments
 - Also caller-saved
 - Can be modified by procedure
- **%r10, %r11**
 - Caller-saved
 - Can be modified by procedure

Return value

%rax

Arguments

%rdi

%rsi

%rdx

%rcx

%r8

%r9


Caller-saved
temporaries

%r10

%r11

x86-64 Linux Register Usage #2

- **%rbx, %r12, %r13, %r14**
 - Callee-saved
 - Callee must save & restore
- **%rbp**
 - Callee-saved
 - Callee must save & restore
 - May be used as frame pointer
 - Can mix & match
- **%rsp**
 - Special form of callee save
 - Restored to original value upon exit from procedure




Callee-Saved Example

```
long call_incr2(long x) {
    long v1 = 15213;
    long v2 = incr(&v1, 3000);
    return x+v2;
}
```


call_incr2:

```
pushq    %rbx
subq     $16, %rsp
movq     %rdi, %rbx
movq     $15213, 8(%rsp)
movl     $3000, %esi
leaq    8(%rsp), %rdi
call     incr
addq     %rbx, %rax
addq     $16, %rsp
popq     %rbx
ret
```


Initial Stack Structure



Resulting Stack Structure



Pre-return Stack Structure



Today

- Control
 - Control: Condition codes
 - Conditional branches
 - Loops
 - Switch Statements
- Procedures
 - Stack Structure
 - Passing control & data
 - Managing local data
 - **Illustration of Recursion**
- Buffer Overflow (Attacks)

Recursive Function Terminal Case

```

/* Recursive popcount */
long pcount_r(unsigned long x) {
    if (x == 0)
        return 0;
    else
        return (x & 1)
            + pcount_r(x >> 1);
}

```

```

pcount_r:
    movl    $0, %eax
    testq   %rdi, %rdi
    je     .L6
    pushq  %rbx
    movq   %rdi, %rbx
    andl   $1, %ebx
    shrq   %rdi
    call   pcount_r
    addq   %rbx, %rax
    popq   %rbx
.L6:
    rep; ret

```

Register	Use(s)	Type
%rdi	x	Argument
%rax	Return value	Return value

Recursive Function Register Save

```

/* Recursive popcount */
long pcount_r(unsigned long x) {
    if (x == 0)
        return 0;
    else
        return (x & 1)
            + pcount_r(x >> 1);
}


```

```

pcount_r:
    movl    $0, %eax
    testq   %rdi, %rdi
    je     .L6
    pushq   %rbx
    movq    %rdi, %rbx
    andl    $1, %ebx
    shrq    %rdi
    call    pcount_r
    addq    %rbx, %rax
    popq    %rbx
.L6:
    rep; ret

```

Register	Use(s)	Type
%rdi	x	Argument



Recursive Function Call Setup

```

/* Recursive popcount */
long pcount_r(unsigned long x) {
    if (x == 0)
        return 0;
    else
        return (x & 1)
            + pcount_r(x >> 1);
}

```

```

pcount_r:
    movl    $0, %eax
    testq   %rdi, %rdi
    je     .L6
    pushq   %rbx
    movq    %rdi, %rbx
    andl    $1, %ebx
    shrq    %rdi
    call    pcount_r
    addq    %rbx, %rax
    popq    %rbx
.L6:
    rep; ret

```

Register	Use(s)	Type
%rdi	x >> 1	Rec. argument
%rbx	x & 1	Callee-saved

Recursive Function Call

```

/* Recursive popcount */
long pcount_r(unsigned long x) {
    if (x == 0)
        return 0;
    else
        return (x & 1)
            + pcount_r(x >> 1);
}

```

```

pcount_r:
    movl    $0, %eax
    testq   %rdi, %rdi
    je     .L6
    pushq   %rbx
    movq    %rdi, %rbx
    andl    $1, %ebx
    shrq    %rdi
    call    pcount_r
    addq    %rbx, %rax
    popq    %rbx
.L6:
    rep; ret

```

Register	Use(s)	Type
%rbx	x & 1	Callee-saved
%rax	Recursive call return value	

Recursive Function Result

```

/* Recursive popcount */
long pcount_r(unsigned long x) {
    if (x == 0)
        return 0;
    else
        return (x & 1)
            + pcount_r(x >> 1);
}

```

Register	Use(s)	Type
<code>%rbx</code>	<code>x & 1</code>	Callee-saved
<code>%rax</code>	Return value	

```

pcount_r:
    movl    $0, %eax
    testq   %rdi, %rdi
    je     .L6
    pushq   %rbx
    movq    %rdi, %rbx
    andl    $1, %ebx
    shrq    %rdi
    call    pcount_r
    addq    %rbx, %rax
    popq    %rbx
.L6:
    rep; ret

```

Recursive Function Completion

```

/* Recursive popcount */
long pcount_r(unsigned long x) {
    if (x == 0)
        return 0;
    else
        return (x & 1)
            + pcount_r(x >> 1);
}


```

Register	Use(s)	Type
<code>%rax</code>	Return value	Return value

```

pcount_r:
    movl    $0, %eax
    testq   %rdi, %rdi
    je     .L6
    pushq   %rbx
    movq    %rdi, %rbx
    andl    $1, %ebx
    shrq    %rdi
    call   pcount_r
    addq    %rbx, %rax
    popq    %rbx
.L6:
    rep; ret

```



Today

- Control
 - Control: Condition codes
 - Conditional branches
 - Loops
 - Switch Statements
- Procedures
 - Stack Structure
 - Passing control & data
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 - Illustration of Recursion
- Buffer Overflow (Attacks)
- SSE, SIMD, FP

x86-64 Linux Memory Layout


00007FFFFFFF

- Stack
 - Runtime stack (8MB limit)
 - E. g., local variables
- Heap
 - Dynamically allocated as needed
 - When call `malloc()`, `calloc()`, `new()`
- Data
 - Statically allocated data
 - E.g., global vars, `static` vars, string constants
- Text / Shared Libraries
 - Executable machine instructions
 - Read-only

Hex Address



400000
000000



Memory Allocation Example

```

char big_array[1L<<24]; /* 16 MB */
char huge_array[1L<<31]; /* 2 GB */


int global = 0;

int useless() { return 0; }

int main ()
{
    void *p1, *p2, *p3, *p4;
    int local = 0;
    p1 = malloc(1L << 28); /* 256 MB */
    p2 = malloc(1L << 8); /* 256 B */
    p3 = malloc(1L << 32); /* 4 GB */
    p4 = malloc(1L << 8); /* 256 B */
    /* Some print statements ... */
}

```


Where does everything go?



x86-64 Example Addresses

address range $\sim 2^{47}$

local	0x00007ffe4d3be87c
p1	0x00007f7262a1e010
p3	0x00007f7162a1d010
p4	0x000000008359d120
p2	0x000000008359d010
big_array	0x0000000080601060
huge_array	0x0000000000601060
main()	0x000000000040060c
useless()	0x0000000000400590



Today


- Control
 - Control: Condition codes
 - Conditional branches
 - Loops
 - Switch Statements
- Procedures
 - Stack Structure
 - Passing control & data
 - Managing local data
 - Illustration of Recursion
- Buffer Overflow (Attacks)
- SSE, SIMD, FP

Memory Referencing Bug Example

```
typedef struct {
    int a[2];
    double d;
} struct_t;
```

Explanation:

```
fun(0)  ↪ 3.14
fun(1)  ↪ 3.14
fun(2)  ↪ 3.1399998664856
fun(3)  ↪ 2.00000061035156
fun(4)  ↪ 3.14
fun(6)  ↪ Segmentation fault
```



Such problems are a BIG deal

- Generally called a “buffer overflow”
 - when exceeding the memory size allocated for an array
- Why a big deal?
 - It's the #1 technical cause of security vulnerabilities
 - #1 overall cause is social engineering / user ignorance
- Most common form
 - Unchecked lengths on string inputs
 - Particularly for bounded character arrays on the stack
 - sometimes referred to as stack smashing

String Library Code

- Implementation of Unix function `gets()`

```
/* Get string from stdin */
char *gets(char *dest)
{
    int c = getchar();
    char *p = dest;
    while (c != EOF && c != '\n') {
        *p++ = c;
        c = getchar();
    }
    *p = '\0';
    return dest;
}
```

- No way to specify limit on number of characters to read
- Similar problems with other library functions
 - **strcpy**, **strcat**: Copy strings of arbitrary length
 - **scanf**, **fscanf**, **sscanf**, when given `%s` conversion specification

Vulnerable Buffer Code

```
/* Echo Line */  
void echo()  
{  
    char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */  
    gets(buf);  
    puts(buf);  
}
```

← btw, how big
is big enough?

```
void call_echo() {  
    echo();  
}
```

```
unix> ./bufdemo-nsp  
Type a string: 012345678901234567890123  
012345678901234567890123
```

```
unix> ./bufdemo-nsp  
Type a string: 0123456789012345678901234  
Segmentation Fault
```

Buffer Overflow Disassembly

echo:

```

00000000004006cf <echo>:
4006cf:  48 83 ec 18          sub     $0x18,%rsp
4006d3:  48 89 e7            mov     %rsp,%rdi
4006d6:  e8 a5 ff ff ff     callq  400680 <gets>
4006db:  48 89 e7            mov     %rsp,%rdi
4006de:  e8 3d fe ff ff     callq  400520 <puts@plt>
4006e3:  48 83 c4 18        add     $0x18,%rsp
4006e7:  c3                  retq

```

call_echo:


```

4006e8:  48 83 ec 08        sub     $0x8,%rsp
4006ec:  b8 00 00 00 00    mov     $0x0,%eax
4006f1:  e8 d9 ff ff ff     callq  4006cf <echo>
4006f6:  48 83 c4 08        add     $0x8,%rsp
4006fa:  c3                  retq

```

Buffer Overflow Stack Example

Before call to gets



```
void echo()
{
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
    . . .
}
```

```
echo:
    subq    $24, %rsp
    movq    %rsp, %rdi
    call   gets
    . . .
```

call_echo:

```
. . .
4006f1: callq    4006cf <echo>
4006f6: add     $0x8, %rsp
. . .
```

buf ← %rsp

Buffer Overflow Stack Example #1

After call to gets

Stack Frame for call_echo			
00	00	00	00
00	40	06	f6
00	32	31	30
39	38	37	36
35	34	33	32
31	30	39	38
37	36	35	34
33	32	31	30

buf ← %rsp

```
void echo()
{
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
    . . .
}
```

call_echo:

```
. . .
4006f1: callq 4006cf <echo>
4006f6: add $0x8,%rsp
. . .
```

```
echo:
    subq $24,%rsp
    movq %rsp,%rdi
    call gets
    . . .
```

Overflowed buffer, but did not corrupt state

```
unix> ./bufdemo-nsp
Type a string: 01234567890123456789012
01234567890123456789012
```

Buffer Overflow Stack Example #2

After call to gets

Stack Frame for call_echo			
00	00	00	00
00	40	00	34
33	32	31	30
39	38	37	36
35	34	33	32
31	30	39	38
37	36	35	34
33	32	31	30

buf ← %rsp

```
void echo()
{
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
    . . .
}
```

call_echo:

```
. . .
4006f1: callq 4006cf <echo>
4006f6: add $0x8,%rsp
. . .
```

```
echo:
    subq $24,%rsp
    movq %rsp,%rdi
    call gets
    . . .
```

Overflowed buffer and
corrupted return pointer

```
unix> ./bufdemo-nsp
Type a string: 0123456789012345678901234
Segmentation Fault
```

Buffer Overflow Stack Example #3

After call to gets

Stack Frame for call_echo			
00	00	00	00
00	40	06	00
33	32	31	30
39	38	37	36
35	34	33	32
31	30	39	38
37	36	35	34
33	32	31	30

buf ← %rsp

```
void echo()
{
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
    . . .
}
```

```
echo:
    subq    $24, %rsp
    movq    %rsp, %rdi
    call   gets
    . . .
```

call_echo:


```
. . .
4006f1:    callq   4006cf <echo>
4006f6:    add     $0x8, %rsp
. . .
```

Overflowed buffer, corrupted
return pointer, but program
seems to work!

But "Returns" to unrelated code

```
unix> ./bufdemo-nsp
Type a string: 012345678901234567890123
012345678901234567890123
```

Code Injection Attacks



- Input string contains byte representation of executable code
- Overwrite return address A with address of buffer B
- When Q executes `ret`, will jump to exploit code

What to do about buffer overflow attacks

- Avoid overflow vulnerabilities
- Employ system-level protections
- Have compiler use “stack canaries”

1. Avoid Overflow Vulnerabilities in Code (!)


```
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */
    fgets(buf, 4, stdin);
    puts(buf);
}
```

- For example, use library routines that limit string lengths
 - **fgets** instead of **gets**
 - **strncpy** instead of **strcpy**
 - Don't use **scanf** with **%s** conversion specification
 - Use **fgets** to read the string
 - Or use **%ns** where **n** is a suitable integer

2. System-Level Protections can help

- Randomized stack offsets
 - At start of program, allocate random amount of space on stack
 - Shifts stack addresses for entire program
 - Makes it difficult for hacker to predict beginning of inserted code
 - E.g.: 5 executions of memory allocation code
 - Stack repositioned each time program executes


local 0x7ffe4d3be87c 0x7ff75a4f9fc 0x7ffeadb7c80c 0x7ffeaea2fdac 0x7ffcd452017c



2. System-Level Protections can help

- **Nonexecutable code segments**
 - In traditional x86, can mark region of memory as either “read-only” or “writeable”
 - Can execute anything readable
 - X86-64 added explicit “execute” permission
 - Stack marked as non-executable

data written
by `gets()`



Any attempt to execute this code will fail

3. Stack Canaries can help

- Idea
 - Place special value (“canary”) on stack just beyond buffer
 - Check for corruption before exiting function
- GCC Implementation
 - **-fstack-protector**
 - Now the default (disabled earlier)

```
unix> ./bufdemo-sp  
Type a string:0123456  
0123456
```

```
unix> ./bufdemo-sp  
Type a string:01234567  
*** stack smashing detected ***
```


Protected Buffer Disassembly

echo:

```
40072f:  sub    $0x18,%rsp
400733:  mov    %fs:0x28,%rax
40073c:  mov    %rax,0x8(%rsp)
400741:  xor    %eax,%eax
400743:  mov    %rsp,%rdi
400746:  callq 4006e0 <gets>
40074b:  mov    %rsp,%rdi
40074e:  callq 400570 <puts@plt>
400753:  mov    0x8(%rsp),%rax
400758:  xor    %fs:0x28,%rax
400761:  je     400768 <echo+0x39>
400763:  callq 400580 <__stack_chk_fail@plt>
400768:  add    $0x18,%rsp
40076c:  retq
```

Setting Up Canary

Before call to gets




```
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

```
echo:
    . . .
    movq    %fs:40, %rax    # Get canary
    movq    %rax, 8(%rsp)  # Place on stack
    xorl    %eax, %eax     # Erase canary
    . . .
```

Checking Canary

After call to gets



```
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

Input: 0123456

```
echo:
    . . .
    movq    8(%rsp), %rax    # Retrieve from stack
    xorq   %fs:40, %rax     # Compare to canary
    je     .L6              # If same, OK
    call   __stack_chk_fail # FAIL
.L6:
    . . .
```

Return-Oriented Programming Attacks

- Challenge (for hackers)
 - Stack randomization makes it hard to predict buffer location
 - Marking stack nonexecutable makes it hard to insert binary code
- Alternative Strategy
 - Use existing code
 - E.g., library code from `stdlib`
 - String together fragments to achieve overall desired outcome
 - *Does not overcome stack canaries*
- Construct program from *gadgets*
 - Sequence of instructions ending in `ret`
 - Encoded by single byte `0xc3`
 - Code positions fixed from run to run
 - Code is executable

Gadget Example #1

```
long ab_plus_c
(long a, long b, long c) {
    return a*b + c;
}
```

```
00000000004004d0 <ab_plus_c>:
4004d0: 48 0f af fe  imul %rsi,%rdi
4004d4: 48 8d 04 17  lea (%rdi,%rdx,1),%rax
4004d8: c3          retq
```

$\text{rax} \leftarrow \text{rdi} + \text{rdx}$

Gadget address = 0x4004d4

- Use tail end of existing functions

Gadget Example #2

```
void setval(unsigned *p) {
    *p = 3347663060u;
}
```

```
<setval>:
4004d9:  c7 07 d4 48 89 c7  movl  $0xc78948d4, (%rdi)
4004df:  c3                retq
```


Encodes `movq %rax, %rdi`

`rdi ← rax`

Gadget address = `0x4004dc`

- Repurpose byte codes

ROP Execution



- Trigger with `ret` instruction
 - Will start executing Gadget 1
- Final `ret` in each gadget will start next one

Today


- Control
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- **SSE, SIMD, FP**

Programming with SSE3


XMM Registers

■ 16 total, each 16 bytes


■ 16 single-byte integers



■ 8 16-bit integers



■ 4 32-bit integers




■ 4 single-precision floats



■ 2 double-precision floats



■ 1 single-precision float




■ 1 double-precision float



Scalar & SIMD Operations


■ Scalar Operations: Single Precision

`addss %xmm0, %xmm1`




■ SIMD Operations: Single Precision

`addps %xmm0, %xmm1`



■ Scalar Operations: Double Precision

`addsd %xmm0, %xmm1`



FP Basics

- Arguments passed in `%xmm0`, `%xmm1`, ...
- Result returned in `%xmm0`
- All XMM registers caller-saved

```
float fadd(float x, float y)
{
    return x + y;
}
```

```
# x in %xmm0, y in %xmm1
addss    %xmm1, %xmm0
ret
```

```
double dadd(double x, double y)
{
    return x + y;
}
```

```
# x in %xmm0, y in %xmm1
addsd    %xmm1, %xmm0
ret
```

FP Memory Referencing

- Integer (and pointer) arguments passed in regular registers
- FP values passed in XMM registers
- Different mov instructions to move between XMM registers, and between memory and XMM registers

```
double dincr(double *p, double v)
{
    double x = *p;
    *p = x + v;
    return x;
}
```

```
# p in %rdi, v in %xmm0
movapd  %xmm0, %xmm1    # Copy v
movsd   (%rdi), %xmm0   # x = *p
addsd   %xmm0, %xmm1    # t = x + v
movsd   %xmm1, (%rdi)   # *p = t
ret
```

Summarizing

- Control
 - Jmp instructions implement “goto” like syntax
 - Conditional jmp instructions implement “if” like syntax
 - An “if” that jumps back is a “while loop” that can implement all other loops
- Procedures
 - Registers are used for variable storage and to orchestrate other things
 - Register discipline is important, e.g. return values, caller- and callee-saved, etc
 - Recursion is not a special case
- Buffer Overflow (Attacks)
 - Result from poor coding practices
- SSE, SIMD, FP
 - Specialized instructions implement specialized models

18-600 Foundations of Computer Systems

Lecture 7: "Processor Architecture and Design"

John P. Shen

September 20, 2017

Next Time ...

➤ Required Reading Assignment:

- Chapter 4 of CS:APP (3rd edition) by Randy Bryant & Dave O'Hallaron.

➤ Recommended Reference:

- ❖ Chapters 1 and 2 of Shen and Lipasti (SnL).

