

Lecture 21: Applications of protected computing

- Lab 11 due Wednesday 5/1
- Online course evaluation is live at bu.campuslabs.com/courseeval
- Thursday office hours: 12-1pm and 3-5pm
- Final exam
 - Scope: all topics covered in lectures, recitations, and labs (except law/policy)
 - Sample final exam has been posted on Piazza
 - Final exam review session is on Saturday 5/3 at 3-5pm (location TBD)

Data is valuable

share data → new social insights



Data is toxic


silo data → safeguard privacy



Cryptography *enables* secure data analysis *for* social benefit




Yao's Protocol: overview




- ▶ Given garbled f + garbled inputs + all output labels \Rightarrow Bob learns **only** $f(x, y)$

Garbled circuit framework [Yao86]




Garbled circuit framework [Yao86]



Garbling a circuit:

- Pick random **labels** W_0, W_1 on each wire


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Garbling a circuit:

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
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- ▶ **Garbled encoding** \equiv one label per wire

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
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Garbled evaluation:

- ▶ Only one ciphertext per gate is decryptable

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
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
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
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
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
Oblivious transfer

How does evaluator (Bob) get the garbled input?



Oblivious transfer


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Garbler's inputs: She knows both A_0, A_1 , and which one is correct \Rightarrow just send correct one to Bob


Oblivious transfer

How does evaluator (Bob) get the garbled input?




Garbler's inputs: She knows both A_0, A_1 , and which one is correct \Rightarrow just send correct one to Bob

Evaluator's inputs: We need the following “gadget” (oblivious transfer):




How to construct OT?



Need public-key encryption that supports **blind key generation**:

- ▶ sample a public key without knowledge of secret key
- ▶ E.g.: ElGamal (sample group element without knowing discrete log)

How to construct OT?



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Summary so far

Secure Computation allows parties to perform a computation on private input, learning **only the output**.

- ▶ market clearing price, advertising revenue, . . .

Security: every attack against the protocol can be “simulated” in an **ideal world** interaction.

Yao’s protocol:

- ▶ Garbled lookup table for each gate of boolean circuit
- ▶ Oblivious transfer for each input wire

BOSTON

— closing the —

WAGE GAP

*Becoming the Best City in America
for Working Women*

2013



CITY OF BOSTON
Thomas M. Menino
Mayor

100% TALENT

The Boston Women's Compact



CITY OF BOSTON
Office of the Mayor
Martin J. Walsh



STATE STREET



FOUNDED BY BRIGHAM AND WOMEN'S HOSPITAL
AND MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL



Charlestown
nursery school



Tech Networks of Boston
We're better together.



WILLIAM
GALLAGHER
ASSOCIATES



BOSTON

— closing the —

WAGE GAP

*Becoming the Best City in America
for Working Women*

2013



100% TALENT

The Boston Women's Compact

SIMMONS
COLLEGE

BOSTON • MASSACHUSETTS



CITY OF BOSTON



STATE STREET

EMC²

Ravtheon

Goal 3: Evaluating Success

Employers agree to... contribute data to a report *compiled by a third party* on the Compact's success to date. *Employer-level data would not be identified* in the report.

TUFTS  Health Plan


Top it off[®]

WGA WILLIAM
GALLAGHER
ASSOCIATES


WHEELLOCK
COLLEGE

tBf The Boston
Foundation
INNOVATION. INFORMATION. IMPACT.

Employers



Employees



100% Talent Data Submission



Number Of Employees

[illegible]

100% Talent Data Submission





Number Of Employees


[illegible]

Total Annual Compensation (Dollars)

[illegible]



CITY of BOSTON




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
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
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

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Trust Spectrum



Trust us



Trust anyone




Trust no one



Techniques for cryptographically secure computing

- Garbled circuits
- Secret sharing




Additional applications of protected computing

Cloudflare: anonymous web browsing

Image: Wikipedia



- Goal: anonymous authentication
- Primitive: verifiable oblivious PRF



Callisto: A Cryptographic Approach To Detect Serial Predators Of Sexual Misconduct

Anjana Rajan Lucy Qin David Archer
Dan Boneh Tancrède Lepoint Mayank Varia


March 29, 2018

Last updated: November 14, 2018

Abstract

Callisto, a non-profit that has created an online sexual assault reporting platform for college campuses, has expanded its work to combat sexual assault and professional sexual coercion in other industries. In our new product, users will be invited to an online *matching escrow* that will detect repeat perpetrators and create pathways to support for victims. Users of this product enter incident details and perpetrator identities into the escrow. This data can only be decrypted by a Legal Options Counselor (a third-party lawyer vetted by Callisto) when at least one other user enters the identity of the same perpetrator. If perpetrator identities match, each user is assigned a Legal Options Counselor, who will connect users to each other (if appropriate) and help each user determine their best path towards justice. User relationships with Legal Options Counselors are structured so that relevant communications benefit from client-counselor privilege. A combination of client-side encryption, encrypted communication channels, oblivious pseudo-random functions, key federation, and Shamir Secret Sharing keep data encrypted so that only Legal Options Counselors gain access to identifying user submitted data when a perpetrator match is identified. In this paper, we present an informal risk management assessment, threat model, and cryptographic solution overview for our new product. A later paper will provide a formal security analysis and mathematical proofs of our cryptographic scheme.

- Identifying information about a survivor and the accused can only be decrypted by a lawyer when at least 2 users name the same perpetrator
- Demo available online at cryptography.projectcallisto.org



Protecting cryptographic keys

Unbound tech



Source: Archer et al, *From Keys to Databases – Real-World Applications of Secure MPC*

Protecting cryptographic keys


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Preveil


“IT can still access encrypted corporate information and recover user keys using Approval Groups. They are the cryptographic equivalent of giving fragments of your house key to your neighbors. No single neighbor can access your house, but if you lose your key, your neighbors can get you back in.”



Source: www.preveil.com

Google: keyboard predictions

- Train a deep neural network for keyboard typing predictions
- Stochastic gradient descent over high-dimensional vectors



Source: Bonawitz, Ivanov, Kreuter, Marcedone, McMahan, Patel, Ramage, Segal, and Seth, *Practical Secure Aggregation for Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning*

Partisia: financial markets

- Auctions (eg sugar beets)



Source: Bogetoft, Christensen, Damgard, Geisler, Jakobsen, Krøigaard, Nielsen, Nielsen, Nielsen, Pagter, Schwartzbach, and Toft, *Secure Multiparty Computation Goes Live*

Partisia: financial markets

- Auctions (eg sugar beets)
- Market clearinghouse
 - Match incoming orders
 - Compare with price signals from realized trades



Source: Archer, Bogdanov, Lindell, Kamm, Nielsen, Pagter, Smart, and Wright,
From Keys to Databases – Real-World Applications of Secure MPC


Partisia: financial markets

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- Credit rating
 - Uses linear programming
 - Input: farmers of all banks



Sharemind: audit VAT tax revenue

- Worked with Estonian Tax and Customs Board
- Test if Company A's VAT credit == Company B's VAT reported



Sharemind: education outcomes

Questions


- Effect of work on graduation rate?
- Diff between CS & other students?

Data size

- 600k education records
- 10m tax payment records

Performance

- 384.5 hours during live study
- 5 hours after optimizations



Source: Bogdanov, Kamm, Kubo, Rebane, Sokk, and Talviste,
Students and Taxes: a Privacy-Preserving Social Study Using Secure Computation

US education outcomes: coming soon?

- College Transparency Act
- Student Right to Know Before You Go

115TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. _____

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. WYDEN (for himself, Mr. RUBIO, and Mr. WARNER) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

“in designing, establishing, and maintaining the higher education data system, ... the Commissioner shall use ***secure multiparty computation technologies***”