Session, Cookie, and Web Security



Building Modern Web Applications - CPEN322

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Session

- 1. Session
- 2. Cookie
- 3. Web Security



Session: What is it?






Session: What is it?

- At a high-level, a session is something that keeps track of the series of interactions between communicating parties
 - It is a shared "context"
- In the context of **web applications**, a session keeps track of the communication **between the server and the client**






























- HTTP is stateless
 - One request-response pair has no information about another request-response pair
 - Server cannot tell if 2 requests came from the same browser → server cannot maintain stateful information about the client (e.g., how many times a client viewed a page)
- Interaction between 2 communicating parties (client & server) involving multiple messages require some state to be maintained



Cookie

1. Session

2. Cookie


3. Web Security



 Cookie is a piece of data that is always passed between the server and the client in consecutive HTTP messages




- At the minimum, a cookie can store a session ID to relate multiple
 HTTP requests and responses
- Mainly used for:
 - Session management
 - Personalization
 - Tracking User Behaviour




























Cookie: Format

- Name: indicates the type of information
- Value: the data representing the information
- Attributes: set by server only
 - o Domain: specifies the scope of the cookie
 - Path: which path the cookie is allowed to be sent to
 - Expires: when the cookie should expire
 - Max-Age: the maximum age for the cookie
 - Secure: enforce cookie to be sent only via https
 - HttpOnly: do not expose the cookie to application layer (e.g., JavaScript)



Cookie: Format

Example: Server Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Type: text/html

Set-Cookie: sessionid=abcdef12345

Set-Cookie: theme=default Set-Cookie: language=en Set-Cookie: currency=cad

<html>Hello World</html>



Cookie: Format

Example: Client Request

GET /hello.html HTTP/1.1

Host: example.com

Cookie: sessionid=abcdef12345

Cookie: theme=default Cookie: language=en Cookie: currency=cad



Cookie: Let's Hack

 Scenario: You have obtained Vicky's (our victim) session cookie for the Bank of CPEN322. Using the session cookie, you want to impersonate Vicky and then transfer her money to your account.



Bank of CPEN322 Bank App is at: http://3.96.141.132:5000

Your username: Your Github Username


Your password: Your Student Number

Vicky's session cookie: db7068de02ff8861c1a1432b651ef0c2


Web Security

- 1. Session
- 2. Cookie
- 3. Web Security

















































 Cross-site Scripting is executing a foreign (and malicious) piece of code as if it was included in the compromised webpage



- Somehow get the browser to execute a script with the permissions of the attacked domain
 - Non-persistent (disappears after page reloads)
 - Persistent (persists across page reloads)
- Most common method: somehow inject JavaScript code into a resource of the attacked domain so that the code executes with the authority of the parent and can access it

 Non-persistent: Occurs when server-side code accepts a query string or form submitted by the user, and sends the string back to the client as a new page or AJAX response without validating it



- User can inject malicious JavaScript code into the query string or form input (can be hidden)
- The script when it is sent back now executes with the authority of the server's origin and can access all resources of the same origin at the client

 Scenario: You have discovered a XSS vulnerability on an online shopping application. Exploiting this vulnerability, you want to steal the cookies of signed-in users, and hijack their session to read their credit card information.



CPEN322 Online Store is at: http://3.96.141.132:3000

Your personal storage is at: http://3.96.141.132:8080/USERNAME

To push data to your storage, use:

http://3.96.141.132:8080/USERNAME/push?text=DATA

To access your storage, include your student number in the query string:

http://3.96.141.132:8080/USERNAME?access=StudentNumber

 Persistent: In a persistent XSS attack, the attack string is stored on the server so that future visits to the website (by the same user or different users) would also be subject to the attack



- Much more devastating than the reflected attacks
- Result from server not checking the user-specified string before storing it to a database or file (say)

 Scenario: You have discovered a XSS vulnerability on an instant messaging platform. You want to launch a mass XSS attack to steal all the cookies of the logged in users.



CPEN322 Instant Messenger App is at: http://3.96.141.132:4000

Your personal storage is at: http://3.96.141.132:8080/USERNAME

To push data to your storage, use:

http://3.96.141.132:8080/USERNAME/push?text=DATA


To access your storage, include your student number in the query string:

http://3.96.141.132:8080/USERNAME?access=StudentNumber


Defense

- Sanitizing user input by checking for JS
 - Hard to do as JS code can be concealed in many ways (e.g., by escaping within HTML or CSS tags)
 - Performance overhead on the server for parsing inputs
- Lighter-weight but incomplete methods
 - Tying cookies to the IP address of the user logged in (works only for XSS attacks that try to steal cookies)
 - Disabling scripts on the page or in a specific section of the page (may prevent legit. scripts from running)
 - New method: Content security policy (allow servers to specify approved origins of content for web browsers) – not yet implemented in all browsers



















































































































 An attacker attempts to request a URL sent to a user by spoofing it to their benefit



- Relies on the use of reproducible and guessable URLs (typically as parameters of GET requests)
- Cookies are automatically sent with every request, and hence the URL can perform malicious actions on behalf of the client
 - Do not require the server to accept/allow JavaScript code (unlike XSS attacks)

Example

- Assume that a banking website allows money transfers using the following URL format http://bank.com/transfer.do?to=me&amt=100
- A malicious user can trick another user into clicking the URL (say through an email). If they have logged into the bank's website, then the request will execute with the privileges of the logged in user.
 - Relies on social engineering to carry out attack
 - Malicious URL can be hidden (e.g., in images)



 Scenario: You have discovered a CSRF vulnerability in the CPEN322 Bank App. You want to phish a victim into clicking a link, so that it transfers her money to your account.



CPEN322 Bank is at: http://3.96.141.132:5000

Your personal storage is at: http://3.96.141.132:8080/USERNAME

To create a malicious form, go to: http://3.96.141.132:8080/USERNAME/form/edit

To view your malicious form, go to: http://3.96.141.132:8080/USERNAME/form

To phish a victim, go to: http://3.96.141.132:4000

Defense

- Make the URL hard to guess by attaching a random nonce or client-specific key to it
 - Works only if nonce/key is not leaked, and is complex
- Things that don't work, but are often deployed
 - Using POST instead of GET requests (pointless)
 - Using multi-step transactions (makes it harder for the attacker, but they can still forge the sequence)
 - Using a secret cookie (all related cookies will be submitted with every request, even the secret ones)

