

Lightning Network

Joseph Poon joseph@lightning.network
Thaddeus Dryja rx@awsomnet.org

Problems

- Transactions aren't instant
- Micropayments don't actually work
 - High transaction fees
- “Bitcoin Doesn't Scale”

“Bitcoin Doesn’t Scale”

- 1 MB blocks:
 - 7 transactions per second @ 250 bytes/tx
 - ~220 million transactions per **year**
 - Not enough for a city, let alone the world
- 1 Billion transactions per day:
 - 1.6 GB blocks (1655 MB)
 - 87 Terabytes/year (87029089 MB)
 - Maybe enough for one large metro area?
 - Centralization (mining!)

“Bitcoin Doesn’t Scale”

- 7 billion people doing 2 blockchain transactions per day
 - 24 GB blocks
 - 3.5 TB/day
 - 1.27 PB/year
- Bigger blocks = Centralization
 - Very few full nodes
 - Very few miners
 - De facto inability to validate blockchain

Scalability Solutions

- The SQL Database Model
 - Very scalable, very fast
 - Off chain transactions implemented today with ChangeTip, Coinbase, others
- Sidechains
 - Many blockchains with inter-chain transfers
- Payment Channels
 - Many payments between two pre-determined parties

Scalability Solutions

- The SQL Database Model
 - Also implemented by MTGox Redeemable Codes
- Sidechains
 - Not primarily a scalability solution
 - Sending funds between chains is two transactions
- Payment Channels
 - Only helps when people pay each other many times (recurring billing, time-based microtransactions)

Anyone to Anyone Payments

- In bitcoin, any output can pay to any other
- In the SQL database model:
 - I need to have an entry in your SQL db
- On Sidechains:
 - I need to be on your sidechain
- In a Payment Channel:
 - I need to have a channel open with you


Bitcoin Lightning Network

- Payment channels between many parties in a multi-hop hub and spoke model (similar to internet routing)
- Minimally trusted intermediaries (they can't take your coins)
- With a malleability fix via a soft-fork, Bitcoin can scale to billions of transactions per day


What are Payment Channels

- Introduced a while ago (not a new idea)
- Uses multi-sig
- Allows two people to send transactions to each other without hitting the Bitcoin blockchain


Unidirectional Channel




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
Unidirectional Channel




Unidirectional Channel




Bidirectional Channel




Bidirectional Channel - Payment




Bidirectional Channel - Payment




Reversing Direction



Closing Bidirectional Channel




3 Party Payments




Alice wants to pay Carol, they both have a channel open with Bob


3 Party Payments




3 Party Payments



3 Party Payments - Trust Issues



3 Party Payments - Trust Issues




Problem: Bob can simply keep the 0.01 BTC
Problem: Carol can claim she never got the coins!

Hash-Locked Contracts


- Using one-way hash functions, Alice can prove she sent funds to Carol off-chain
- Pay to Contract
 - Knowledge of secret R hashed into hash H proves receipt
 - Receiver signs a contract stating if R is disclosed funds have been received

Hash-Locked Contracts


Carol makes a random number R , and keeps it secret. She computes the hash of R , $\text{hash}(R) = H$




Hash-Locked Contracts




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
Hash-Locked Contracts



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
Problem!

- If Carol refuses to disclose **R**, she will hold up the channel between Alice and Bob
 - If her channel expires after Alice and Bob's she can steal funds by redeeming the hashlock!
 - Bob has to be rich for this to really work
- 3rd party low-trust multisig and/or extremely small values sent can mostly work today

Hashed Time-Lock Contract

1. If Bob can produce to Alice input R from hash H within 3 days, Alice will pay Bob 0.01 BTC
2. The above clause is void after 3 days
3. Either party may agree to settle terms using other methods if both agree
4. Violation of terms incurs a maximum penalty of funds in this contract


Hashed Time-Lock Contract



```
OP_DEPTH 3 OP_EQUAL OP_IF OP_HASH160 <R> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_0 2  
<AlicePubkey1> <BobPubkey1> 2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG OP_ELSE OP_0 2  
<AlicePubkey2> <BobPubkey2> 2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG OP_END
```


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Alice wants to send funds to Dave via Bob and Carol




Bitcoin Lightning Network


Dave sends Alice hash **H** produced from random data **R**




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
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
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
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
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
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
Broken Channel




Broken Channel




Timeout



Timeout



Timeout



Timeout

