EECS 388: Lab 2

Length extension
Hash collisions

Upcoming Deadlines

- Project 1: Cryptography
  - Part 1 due: **Thursday, September 14 at 6 p.m.**
    - Coverage: Length extension attack, Hash collisions
  - Part 2 due: Thursday, September 21 at 6 p.m.
    - Coverage: Padding oracle attack, RSA signature forgery

Reminder: Canvas quizzes due the day before the next lecture

Length Extension Attack

(Project 1, Part 1.1)

Alice messages Bob



What could possibly go wrong?

Alice messages Bob, with a MAC



What is this A4F2EC5DFEF428C8E7CDE710FF6E92AE B96363CAA3971C363189697F1C292F84 ...?

Output from a pseudorandom function; let's call it $f_k(x)$.

- In this case, x = "hello, Bob!"
- f_k is indistinguishable from a random function, unless you know *k*.
  - Alice and Bob know *k*, so they know $\boldsymbol{f_k(x)}$ **for all** ***x***.
  - Mallory doesn't know *k*, and cannot derive $\boldsymbol{f_k(x)}$.
- Embodied by functions like HMAC-SHA256

- What happens if we use plain SHA-256 instead?

Common Hash Function Construction

- MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256: Hash functions utilizing **Merkle-Damgård Construction**



- **Merkle-Damgård Construction:** uses a compression function (h) of small, fixed-size inputs to construct a bigger hash function (H) of variable-length input

Merkle-Damgård Construction



Given $\mathbf{h: T \times X \longrightarrow T}$ (compression function)

we obtain $\mathbf{H: X^{\leq L} \longrightarrow T}$. H_i - chaining variables

PB: padding block

Merkle-Damgård Construction



Merkle-Damgård Construction



Key (proven!) property: if **h** is collision-resistant, then **H** is also collision-resistant.

Makes building a secure hash function easier!
But… introduces length-extension vulnerability :(

Length Extension Attack

- Alice and Bob want to communicate and have integrity
- They have a shared secret key, k, and hash function, H

m = “hello, Bob!”
v = H(k || “hello, Bob!”)

m, v

Mallory intercepts m and v
… what can she do?



Verifies that
H(k || m) == v

Length Extension Attack

She doesn't know this message because it had a secret k, but she doesn't need it….

This is the v that Mallory intercepted

Appended message can be whatever Mallory wants, like "please send $1000"



Feed the output of the hash function into the next SHA-256 block

- Now Mallory can send m = original_message || padding || "please send $1000" ***with a valid v that Bob will accept***

Just need to know the length of the original message so the padding block has the correct length

Length Extension Attack

How can we “extend” a hash computation?

Thought experiment (`h1`): *Imagine you know the original message…*



You can do the same thing without knowing the original message!

`h2`: Start with **`hash(m)`** and ***`length of m`*** in bytes (needed for padding scheme)

We didn’t need to know “Use HMAC, not hashes”, only its hash!

What have we hashed?

h1:

Use HMAC, not hashes\x80\x00\x00\x00\x00…\x00\xa0Good advice

h2:

Use HMAC, not hashes\x80\x00\x00\x00\x00…\x00\xa0Good advice

Important takeaways

- Both hash the same thing
- Both hash padding in the middle



Length Extension Attack: Prevention

- Length extension attack comes from using plain hash functions as a MAC
- It doesn't mean that the hash function itself is a bad hash function
- To make a good MAC function from a hash function, use the HMAC construction, as discussed in lecture:

$$HMAC_k(m) = hash(k \oplus c_1 \,\|\, hash(k \oplus c_2 \,\|\, m))$$

More with Hash Collisions

Properties of *Good Cryptographic* Hash Functions

And how to break them

- Preimage resistance
  - For a given output, find an input that produces it.
- Second-preimage resistance
  - For a given input, find a *different* input with the same output.
- Collision resistance
  - Find *two inputs* that map to the same output.

Collision resistance implies *second-preimage* resistance, but not *preimage* resistance.

Second preimage *attack* implies collision *attack*.



Properties of *Good Cryptographic* Hash Functions



Collision resistance




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334d016f755cd6dc58c53a86e1
83882f8ec14f52fb05345887c8
a5edd42c87b7
```

Preimage resistance




```
334d016f755cd6dc58c53a86e1
83882f8ec14f52fb05345887c8
a5edd42c87b7
```

Second-preimage resistance

RIP MD5 and SHA-1

- ❌ Preimage resistance
  - Theoretically broken
- ❌ Second preimage resistance
  - Theoretically broken, based on same attack above
- ❌ Collision resistance
  - Totally broken

RIP MD5 and SHA-1

Collisions with an identical prefix

MD5: 2004 (cost in 2023: free, you do this using *fastcoll*!)

SHA-1: 2017 (cost in 2023: ~$10,000)

Collisions with a (chosen) pair of different prefixes

MD5: 2007 (cost in 2023: ~$5)

SHA-1: 2019 (cost in 2023: ~$75,000)

SHA-1 Collisions!





https://shattered.io/

Review: Hashing vs Encryption?

When do we use a **hash function** vs. a **MAC**?

Hash function

MAC

See you next week!