Midterm Exam

If you are currently experiencing COVID-19 symptoms, *do not take this exam!* Go home, get a COVID test, and contact the course staff for an alternative test-taking arrangement.

Do not open this booklet until instructed to begin the exam. This exam is closed book and closed notes. You may not use any electronic devices or communicate with anyone other than course staff.

Write your answers legibly, and use dark printing, since the exam will be scanned for grading. The intended answers fit within the spaces provided. You will only be graded on the answers that are within the provided spaces.

Security is hard, and so is this exam. Do your best, and keep calm! The exam grades will be curved.

Time limit: **70 minutes**.

Write and sign the honor code pledge:

		ve neither given nor received unau nave I concealed any violations of i
(Signature)		
your name)	(Print	
(Uniquame)		

Question:	1	2	3	4	Total
Points:	10	15	15	10	50
Score:					

4	α	4	A		
	Sn	ort	Δn	swe	r
1.		VI L		3 W L	

	algorithm of each (specifying its type) and a situation in which you would use each.
)	[2 points] Which is regarded as the safest order of operations when constructing a secur
	channel to send a message p ? Choose one.
	\bigcirc Let $c := \text{Encrypt}_{k_1}(p)$, then send $c \parallel \text{HMAC}_{k_2}(c)$
	$\bigcirc \text{ Let } c := \text{Encrypt}_{k_1}(p), \text{ then send } c \parallel \text{HMAC}_{k_2}(p)$
	$\bigcirc \text{ Let } v := \text{HMAC}_{k_1}(p), \text{ then send Encrypt}_{k_2}(p \parallel v)$
	\bigcirc Let $v := \text{HMAC}_{k_1}(p)$, then send $\text{Encrypt}_{k_2}(p) \parallel v$
	Explain why your choice is the safest:
,	[3 points] At a high level, describe how SQL injection and XSS attacks work. Then, stat one key similarity and one key difference between the two attacks.
•	
	one key similarity and one key difference between the two attacks. [2 points] Two alternatives for implementing multi-factor authentication are time-base one-time passwords (TOTP) and U2F hardware tokens (such as Yubikeys). Describe a
	one key similarity and one key difference between the two attacks. [2 points] Two alternatives for implementing multi-factor authentication are time-base one-time passwords (TOTP) and U2F hardware tokens (such as Yubikeys). Describe a attack that can compromise TOTP, but that U2F tokens strongly protect against, and explain
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2. Cryptography

You've been hired to perform a security audit for Shushmail, a new "secure" email service.

Each Shushmail user has an RSA public key with public exponent 3 and a unique 4096-bit modulus N. Another user may encrypt a message m to this key by choosing a random 256-bit key k, using AES to encrypt m using key k: $c_m = \text{AES}_k(m)$ and then using RSA to encrypt k to the recipient's public key: $c_k = k^3 \mod N$. The ciphertext is then (c_k, c_m) . Assume that the keys are properly generated, that users have a way of looking up correct public keys for recipients, and that the private RSA keys are stored securely.

(a) [3 points] Under this protocol, an eavesdropper who intercepts (c_k, c_m) can easily learn

	m. Explain the vulnerability, and state how to change the protocol to fix it. (<i>Hint</i> : Try using pencil and paper to encrypt with, say, $k = 2^8$ and $N = 2^{128} - 2$. What happens?)
to a (Hin	shmail supports two different AES cipher modes: CBC and counter (CTR). However, due bug, it always uses the same initialization vector for CBC and the same nonce for CTR t: Recall that counter mode works like a stream cipher. You XOR each plaintext byte with systream generated by encrypting successive integer values.)
(b)	[3 points] An attacker intercepts the ciphertext of two uncompressed images sent via Shushmail. The images are different but the same size, and both are unknown to the attacker. If both images were encrypted using the same buggy cipher mode, which mode lets the attacker learn more about the images? Explain.

Suppose we fix Shushmail to properly protect confidentiality. A bank uses Shushmail to accept instructions from its customers. The bank, which knows its customers' public keys, first encrypts a message to the customer containing a secret value that is treated as a single-use authorization code. The customer can send money to another account by encrypting a message to the bank of the form: "Transfer \$vvvvv to account xxxxxx; auth=authorization_code."

(c)	[3 points] Suppose the message uses CTR mode, and consider a MiTM attacker who can guess the destination account number. How can they subvert the protocol to steal money? At a high level, how should we change Shushmail to fix this?
trans hash	bank decides to add another layer of protections by requiring customers to confirm sactions by logging into its website using RSA signatures. They use textbook RSA (with no sing or padding). In order to log in, the customer simply needs to submit <i>any</i> message that ecompanied by a valid signature made with their private key.
(d)	[2 points] You've managed to find the bank's CEO's public key (e, N) on the company website. How could you use this information to log in as the CEO?
Shu:	shmail has decided to share "anonymized" server logs with a group of researchers, shmail wants to ensure that users' IP addresses aren't revealed, but the researchers need able to associate different requests that come from the same IP address. The logs are huge, anonymization has to be applied efficiently with only a small, fixed amount of storage.
(e)	[2 points] Shushmail plans to replace each IPv4 address with the SHA-256 hash of the address. Why is this insufficient to provide strong protection for the secrecy of the IPs?
(f)	[2 points] Propose a stronger scheme based on HMAC, and briefly argue why it is better.

3. Web Security

With your success in your recent collaboration, USDCE has asked you to review the security of a web application called SuperDuperSecureLogin. The source code for SuperDuperSecureLogin is shown in the appendix starting on **page 10**.

(a)	[2 points] Is SuperDuperSecureLogin vulnerable to SQL injection? If so, explain the vulnerability. If not, explain how SuperDuperSecureLogin protects against SQL injection.
(b)	[3 points] Assume (independent of the previous question) that an attacker is able to breach SuperDuperSecureLogin's security and gain access to the full contents of the users database table. How can an attacker use this to quickly gain knowledge of user passwords?
(c)	[2 points] Is SuperDuperSecureLogin vulnerable to XSS attacks? If so, explain the vulnerability and state which type of XSS attack SuperDuperSecureLogin is vulnerable to If not, explain how SuperDuperSecureLogin protects against XSS.
(d)	[3 points] How can an attacker retrieve the value of SECRET_STRING (shown on line 60) without exploiting any XSS or SQL injection issue or gaining access to any credentials?

(e) [5 points] It's a busy work day, and people (including the admin account) will be logging into the system. Playing the role of an attacker, how can you discover admin's password, which consists of 64 randomly chosen alphanumeric characters?

You have the following resources at your disposal:

- A server you control, located at https://attacker.com/, that can be used to receive and log HTTP requests.
- A web browser with the ability to make requests to SuperDuperSecureLogin but no credentials. You can perform any supported actions that do not require authentication.

Hint: It's fine if your solution obtains the username and password of *any* user who logs in to the site form, since you can always filter out every user but admin later.

In the box below, explain each step in your attack. If any involves code, provide pseudocode. You don't have to worry about the exact syntax or about the details of any encoding or escaping. You should avoid interfering with normal use of the server, but it's okay if your attack has minor user-visible side effects.


i			

4. Network Security

According to Wikipedia:

The Great Cannon of China is an Internet attack tool that is used by the Chinese government to launch distributed denial-of-service attacks on websites by performing a man-in-the-middle attack on large amounts of web traffic and injecting code which causes the end-user's web browsers to flood traffic to targeted websites. [...] The first known targets of the Great Cannon (in late March 2015) were websites hosting censorship-evading tools, including GitHub and GreatFire, a service monitoring blocked websites in China.

The figure below depicts the Great Cannon in action:



- 1. A browser outside China requests a script via HTTP from a site in China, e.g., hm.baidu.com.
- 2. The Great Firewall, China's censorship infrastructure, sees the request at the national border.
- Before the real site can respond, the Cannon sends a spoofed response containing JavaScript.
- 4. This code runs in the browser and makes a HTTP request to the victim site, GitHub.com.

(a)	[2 points] The Great Cannon is used to launch distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. What is a <i>distributed</i> denial-of-service attack? Why are such attacks more difficult to defend against than non-distributed DoS attacks?
(b)	[1 point] What property of the IP protocol does the Great Cannon exploit to make the client believe that its response packets originated from Baidu?

(c)	[1 point] What property of the TCP protocol does the Great Cannon exploit to allow it to inject traffic into the HTTP connection?
(d)	[2 points] To prevent its users from becoming part of a GC-style attack, Baidu could enable HTTPS for all resources. Name and describe two additional steps it would need to take to ensure that all connections, including those from first-time users, were protected.
(e)	[2 points] How can sites targeted by the Great Cannon defend against such a DDoS attack? Name and describe two measures they can take.
(f)	[2 points] Browser developers could prevent future Great Cannon attacks by requiring HTTPS for all sites. What practical considerations would this raise, and how could they be addressed?

Midterm Exam – Appendix

Do not open this document until instructed to begin the exam.
This appendix contains code or data that you will be asked to examine by one or more specific examproblems. You may use this appendix as scratch space, but nothing you write here will be graded.
Please write your name below and turn in this appendix with your completed exam:
(Print your name) (Uniquame)

Used for Question 3

SuperDuperSecureLogin Code

```
@app.route('/create/', methods=['POST'])
2
   def create(request):
     # these three fields are stored as VARCHAR(1024)
     username = request.args.get('username')
4
             = request.args.get('email')
5
6
     password = request.args.get('password')
7
     passhash = hashlib.md5(password).hexdigest()
8
9
     database.execute('INSERT INTO users (username, email, passhash) VALUES (?,
        ?, ?)', (username, email, passhash))
     return '', 200
10
11
12
   @app.route('/login/')
   def login(request):
13
     all_users = database.execute('SELECT username FROM users').fetchall()
14
     # wraps every username with !:
15
16
     user_list = ''.join(f'{u}' for u in all_users)
17
     return """
18
19
       <script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/jquery/3.6.1/jquery.</pre>
          min.js" integrity="sha512-aVKKRRi/Q/YV+4mjoKBsE4x3H+BkegoM/
          em46NN1CqNTmUYADjBbeNefNxYV7giUp0VxICtqdrbqU7iVaeZNXA==" crossorigin="
          anonymous" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></script>
20
       <script>
         function postAuth(username, password) { /* assume this is implemented
21
             correctly and makes a POST request with the provided parameters to
             the /auth/ endpoint. */ }
22
         function f() {
23
           var username = document.querySelector('#username').value;
24
           var password = document.querySelector('#password').value;
25
           postAuth(username, password);
         }
26
27
       </script>
28
       < h1> Welcome < /h1>
29
       Users:
30
       <u1>{0}</u1>
31
       <h2>Login</h2>
       <form onSubmit="f()">
32
33
         <b>Username:</b>
         <input type="text" name="username" id="username">
34
35
         <b>Password:</b>
         <input type="password" name="password" id="password">
36
37
         <button type="submit">SuperDuperSecureLogin!</button>
       </form>
38
     """.format(user_list)
39
40
41
```

```
42
   @app.route('/auth/', methods=['POST'])
   def auth(request):
43
     username = request.args.get('username')
44
     password = request.args.get('password')
45
     passhash = hashlib.md5(password).hexdigest()
46
47
48
     results = database.execute('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ? AND
        passhash = ?', (username, passhash))
     if len(results.fetchall()) > 0 and username == 'admin':
49
       resp = redirect('/secrets/', code=302)
50
51
     else:
       resp = make_response('Welcome, ' + username)
52
53
     resp.set_cookie('auth', value=username) # adds Set-Cookie response header
54
     return resp
55
   @app.route('/secrets/', methods=['POST'])
56
57
   def secrets(request):
     username = request.cookies.get('auth')
58
59
     if username == 'admin':
       return SECRET_STRING # SECRET_STRING is defined elsewhere
60
     else:
61
       return 'You must be admin to see the secrets'
62
```