Final Exam

If you are currently experiencing COVID-19 symptoms, *do not take this exam!* Go home, get a COVID test, and contact the course staff for an alternative test-taking arrangement.

Do not open this booklet until instructed to begin the exam. This exam is closed book and closed notes. You may not use any electronic devices or communicate with anyone other than course staff.

Write your answers legibly, and use dark printing, since the exam will be scanned for grading. The intended answers fit within the spaces provided. You will only be graded on the answers that are within the provided spaces.

Security is hard, and so is this exam. Do your best, and keep calm! The exam grades will be curved.

Time limit: 90 minutes.

Write and sign the honor code pledge:

or received unauthorized aid on this examination, any violations of the Honor Code."	'I have neither given nor received unau nor have I concealed any violations of t
(Signature)	
(Print your name)	
(Uniqname)	

Question:	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
Points:	15	20	15	20	20	10	100
Score:							

1. Security Potpourri

(a)	[1 point] "Mixing program control and user data" is a class of vulnerabilities where a program accidentally executes user input as code. Which of the following attacks directly exploit this class of vulnerabilities? Select all that apply.
	□ Buffer overflow
	□ Stored XSS
	□ Reflected XSS
	□ CSRF
	□ SQL injection
	☐ Distributed denial of service
	□ Padding oracle attack
(b)	[1 point] Alice and Bob want to securely communicate a message <i>M</i> over an insecure channel using one of the following schemes. Which scheme should they use in order to avoid padding oracle attacks? Select all that apply. Assume that:
	• denotes concatenation • MAC generates a massage authentication and without leaking its input
	 MAC generates a message authentication code without leaking its input Enc is a secure encryption algorithm
	 □ Enc(M) MAC(M) □ Enc(M) MAC(Enc(M)) □ Enc(M MAC(M)) □ MAC(M Enc(M))
(c)	[2 points] Does the use of DNSSEC to resolve eecs388.org guarantee the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of <i>subsequent</i> HTTP connections to eecs388.org? Justify your reasoning.
(d)	[1 point] Which of the following memory safety hardening measures ensures that all writeable regions in memory are non-executable, and all executable regions in memory are non-writeable? Select one. O ASLR O DEP O Stack canaries

	This version of Piazza lists where this information is saccount settings, you notice image on the sidebar to be w	tored in a SQL databethat setting your profile	ease. When pla	ying around	l with your
	https://eecs3	88.org/leslie_nie	elsen.jpg" wi	.dth="1000)
	What kind of vulnerability r	night this indicate on l	Piazza's website	? Select all	that apply
	□ Stored XSS□ Reflected XSS	□ Buffer overflow□ SQL injection	□ CSR	F	
(f)	[3 points] For each of the collision resistant, both, or i	•	H below, dete	rmine if it	is one-way
	i. $H(x) = x^2$		□ One-way	□ Collisio	on resistant
	ii. $H(x) = x^3$		□ One-way	□ Collisio	on resistant
	iii. $H(x) = SHA-256(x[0])$ where notation [a:b] r bytes a to b-1 inclusive	refers to the slice of	□ One-way	□ Collisio	on resistant
(g)	 [3 points] True or False: A sequires and validates Requires and validates Is vulnerable to XSS at 	a hidden validation tol authentication cookies	ken in a form va		
	○ True ○ False				
	Explain your reasoning.				
(h)	[2 points] Choose which to apply.	ols each of the following	ng statements ap	plies to. Sel	ect all that
			Wireshar	k Ghidra	Autopsy
	Can be used to find websit	es accessed by a user			
	Supports the use of keylog	files to decrypt data			
	Free				

(e) [2 points] EECS 388 students are using a modified version of Piazza to discuss projects.

2. Cryptography

Cry	prograpity						
(a)	[2 points] How man	ny keys do	each of the	e following	cryptograpl	nic algorithms use?	
	i. HMAC-SHA256	_					
	ii. SHA-256	_					
	iii. AES	-					
	iv. RSA	-					
(b)	[2 points] Which of that apply. □ One-time pad		C		•		ect al

(c) [2 points] What might the following message look like when it's encrypted with AES using electronic codebook mode with PKCS #7 padding? **Select one.**

HailToTheVictorsHailToTheVictors

For reference:

- AES encrypts messages in 16 byte blocks.
- PKCS#7 padding is the same padding scheme you used for AES in Project 1.
- All answers are in hexadecimal.
- (d) [1 point] What is the cryptographic doom principle? **Select one.**
 - If you write your own cryptography code, you're doomed.
 - O If you use a hash as a MAC, you're doomed.
 - O If you have to perform a cryptographic operation on a message before checking its MAC, you're doomed.
 - O If you use a number smaller than 65536 as the base for your RSA keys, you're doomed.

(e)	mes	points] Adam has an RSA key pair that he uses for people to says sages. Since he doesn't use this pair for signing, he thinks it will be taken to it using the pair, then send the signature acker decrypt a message intended for Adam? Explain why your message intended for Adam?	be fun to se back. How	t up a bot could an
	Ass used	sume that this is textbook RSA. No padding scheme or special med.	essage forr	natting is
(f)		points] For the following questions, consider this passphrase general r words at random from a public, static list of the most common 8		
		What is the maximum number of attempts a brute force guess knowledge of the words and the scheme would take to guess the not need to simplify your answer.	sing algori	thm with
	ii.	What is the key strength of the passphrase measured in bits? i.e. there in a binary key with identical resistance to a brute force att		y bits are
	iii.	Is this passphrase scheme strong enough? Why or why not?	○ Yes	○ No

(g) [4 points] Consider an encryption scheme using a 32-bit block cipher *B*, PKCS #7 padding, and cipher block chaining mode. (Assume all MONOSPACE characters in this question are hexadecimal.)

For a given key K, we know the encryptions of the following 16 values using B. (The other 4 billion or so are unknown.)

m	$B_K(m)$
E5C129F3	C27C5EF0
759CD277	EF234F37
C38C3BB0	B7937886
A4B71B67	83D8D17F
FAF3D671	3DBA5306
1FA52E03	66967137
5E44CD16	FC018F76
1470776E	F4FD5723
0A458C7D	57FABA19
CDA80382	1465AFC6
4B221AED	22D94599
0A458C7E	D5C97014
1FA52E04	EC168116
63FE9E10	06F480C8
E5C129F5	4325A24C
0A458C77	471C8BA6

i. Suppose you want to encrypt a plaintext PT using a initialization vector IV, where

$$PT = 5E44CD16 899D5D$$
 and $IV = FAF3D671$.

Which of the ciphertexts below would you generate? **Select one.** Refer to page 17 in the Appendix for an XOR reference table.

- 3DBA5306 66967137
 FC018F76 EF234F37
 83D8D17F 471C8BA6
 3DBA5306 2B4A99A0
 83D8D17F D5C97014
- ii. What property would you look for to direct a padding oracle attack on a remote server using CBC that does not return unique error messages? Assume that you do not have access to the code the server is running.

-			

3. Web Security

SuperDuperSketchyCorp has decided to branch into social media and instant messaging with their new service SketchyChatTM. SketchyChat allows users to establish personal profiles, visit other users' profile pages, and send direct messages to friends. A U-M student named Clark decides that SketchyChat is the perfect way to make his transition from sophomore year to junior year easy. He creates a base profile without filling in any personal information on his main page. A savvy full-stack dev already, Clark uses Web Inspector to view his base profile, and is able to glean the following information:

- SketchyChat is built with the open-source social networking engine, Elgg
 - SketchyChat assigns each page owner a permanent ID, which can be accessed with the following method of an Elgg object: elgg.session.user.guid
 - SketchyChat assigns each user a permanent security cookie that can be accessed with elgg.security.token
 - Clark's permanent ID is 34.
- When Clark adds friends, the URL endpoint is:

https://superdupersketchycorp.sketchychat.biz/action/friends/add where the friend number to add and the user security token are attached to the URL as query parameters.

• The JQuery CDN link is included in the <head> tag of the web page.

Having studied Samy Kamkar intently, Clark wants to see if he can copy the famous Samy Worm. Clark wants any user that visits his profile page to add him as a friend and receive a cryptic pop-up that reads "HAHA, thanks for the friendship". Clark, however, doesn't want to continually send a request to himself or receive a pop-up when he looks at his own page.

(a) [8 points] Write a script in the box that will accomplish Clark's goals. In the lines that

follow, briefly comment on what type of XSS attack this is and why.				

Another U-M student, Kent, realizes that, after visiting Clark's page, he has added Clark as a friend without hitting the "Add Friend" button. Having taken 388, he realizes that he has been attacked. Furious with Clark, Kent responds by sending him the following link:

https://superdupersketchycorp.sketchychat.biz/mainpage/login? field1=<script>alert("KRClark, YPI took T0388. NI You're better than thisTE.")</script>

(b)	[3 points] What kind of attack is Kent attempting to carry out against Clark? Briefl explain how you know.	y
	○ SQL injection ○ Stored XSS ○ Reflected XSS ○ CSRF	
		_
	nt, wanting to test his attack, tries opening the above URL, but doesn't see an alert. Herves the encoded URL and sees the following:	_ [e
	https://superdupersketchycorp.sketchychat.biz/mainpage/login?field1=%3C%3Calert%28%22KRClark%2C%20YPI%20took%20TO388.%20NIYou%27re%20better%20than%20thisTE%22%29%3C%2F%3C	
(c)	[4 points] What defense is SuperDuperSketchyCorp using that causes the alert to not sho up? How do you know? How can Kent get around this?	W
		_
		_
		_
		_
		_
		_

4. Networking

SuperDuperSketchyCorp is broke after recent lawsuits and can no longer afford a company subscription to "secure" and "safe" password managers, so they have decided to implement their own product: SuperDuperSafePasswordSafe, or SDSPS. SDSPS will be a website that users can visit to generate, store, and retrieve passwords for other websites.

Consider each scenario independently, and assume that all other aspects of SuperDuperSafePasswordSafe are correctly and securely implemented.

(a) [4 points] SuperDuperSketchyCorp doesn't trust outside certificate authorities, so they

i.	Would a browser be able to successfully establish a secure HTTPS connection to superdupersafepasswordsafe.com? Why or why not?	0	Yes	○ No
ii.	What additional steps must an attacker take to trick a certific multiple perspective domain validation compared to a certificate a perspective domain validation?			
eacl	oints] The SuperDuperSafePasswordSafe team has decided to hHTTP request between the client and server and has therefore of TLS are not needed.		-	•
i.	Assume login and user validation are performed with cookies. Is this model susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack assuming each client and the server have previously established a secure key for the team's HTTP body encryption? Why or why not?	0	Yes	○ No

	ii.	Assume the SDSC team has decided to establish the secure key using Diffie-Hellman over HTTP. Explain how an attacker could trick both the client and server applications into believing they have a shared key, and give one possible defense other than using HTTPS that SDSC could use to prevent this.
(c)	hash will ther orig mak will	points] Learning from their previous mistakes, SDSC has decided to store only a salted h of all passwords on their server. When creating a new password, the client application a send the new password to the server over HTTPS. The SDSC server application will he salt and hash the password, store only the result and the salt used, and discard the ginal request. When requesting a password for a website, the client application will see a request over HTTPS to the server with a secure session token, and the server respond with the stored salted hash and original salt corresponding to the requested sword for the user.
		Is this model susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack? Yes No Why or why not?
	ii.	Is the response from the server to retrieve a password Sufficient for the client to retrieve the original password? Why or why not?
(d)	secu	points] Assume now that you are a consultant hired by the SDSC team to test their arity practices. You have been given a network trace of a client who was communicating a the SuperDuperSafePasswordSafe website service, among other websites. Your goal to scour the trace to obtain all the information you can about the exchange in order

to answer questions given to you by the security team. Assume that the client had been

communicating with SDSPS using HTTPS.

(e)

For each question below, **select whether you would expect to be able to determine the answer.** If yes, how would you find the answer (which packet, which layer, etc.)? If no, why not?

Questions from the security team:

i.	"What was the IP address of the client device?"	○ Yes	○ No
ii.	"At what time did the client first make contact with SDSPS?"	○ Yes	○ No
iii.	"What headers were set by the server?"	○ Yes	○ No
iv.	"What was the total count of POST requests made by the client?"	○ Yes	O No
assi is ir	points] The security team claims that the client device used he gned by a very general chip manufacturing company, and therefore a possible to identify even with a full network trace. Name three pield gather in order to determine the identity of the device.	re the type	of device

5. Application Security, Bungled!

You have been passed a work-in-progress application from the Bungle team called Mungle. The Mungle code works in conjunction with some remote Python code located on one of Bungle's servers. One of the features of Mungle is to allow comments to be posted to a user's profile page. The application code for Mungle and the relevant server-side code are available on pages 18 and 19 of the Appendix. Here is some additional helpful information:


- Mungle runs on architecture exactly like the one used for Project 4.
- String arguments to POST(...) are C-strings. Each string argument is read in until a null-byte is encountered. You can assume this function will not modify your stack.
- POST(...) bundles its arguments together, then sends them as a POST message to the server's receive() function. POST(...)'s return value is the return value of receive().
- The server has access to a SQL database. The query() function returns a list of matching records for the given query.
- This database is guaranteed to have more than 1 record in it.
- A query made with the unmodified username and password returns exactly 1 record.
- (a) [8 points] Your goal is to make the program print Flag was set to true. and exit with status 0. You can use the following in your solution:
 - Any Python syntax, including
 - + for concatenation, * for repetition
 - b"Apple" for byte value of the string "Apple"
 - <Hex value>.to_bytes(...) to convert hex values into corresponding byte
 values, like 0x12345678.to_bytes(4, "little")
 - 0x03880388 for the hex equivalent of 59245448
 - offset_of_eip for the offset between lenPtr and the stored EIP
 - address_of_flag
 - address_of_debugging()

i.	What input would you pass to argv[1]?
ii.	What input would you pass to argv[2]?

On another day, you hacked into Wolverine Access and found an opportunity to perform a ROP chain attack by taking advantage of a strcpy call. Specifically, you want to call setuid(0) and thereby escalate your privileges. You find the following gadgets to work with:

0x0470dc : push rax ; ret
0x047c45 : inc rax ; ret
0x0410fc : pop rdx ; pop rax ; ret
0x04d9c2 : xor rdi, rdi ; ret
0x04f98e : add rsp, 8 ; ret
0x041948 : je 0x23a8 ; jmp rax
0x048638 : syscall ; ret
0x048e1f : mov rdx, 0xfffffffffffffffff ; ret
0x0405db : sub rsp 0x80 ; ret
0x04f8f2 : pop rbp ; ret

(b) [8 points] Construct a chain that sets rax to 105, rdi to 0, and finally calls syscall. Fill in the contents you would insert onto the stack below, one 64-bit value per box. You may not need to use all of the boxes.



(c) [2 points] Name a useful feature you can find in GDB that you can't see with just the source code, and state how that feature is useful when performing a buffer overflow. Be as specific as possible.

6. Ethics

There are two types of encryption systems in the sense of privacy: recoverable and unrecoverable encryption. Recoverable encryption systems have backup decryption capabilities that allow authorized users like law enforcement to access a decrypted version of the system, even without clear permission or access to original user's encryption key.

On the other hand, unrecoverable encryption systems have no such backdoor. If the key is destroyed, no one is able to access a decrypted version of the system. This can be used by malicious actors and criminals to hide their activity. China, Russia, France, Brazil, and India all have laws requiring that systems remain recoverable to aid officials in investigations. Some require total recoverability in any case without service provider or user knowledge, as well as the ability to implement surveillance systems if needed. Other countries require encryption providers to enter into agreements to facilitate access to data. Still other countries don't regulate it at all, allowing complete and total privacy for citizens (including malicious actors).

(a)	[5 points] Imagine you are a lawmaker for a new country, <i>HoneymanLand</i> . In a few sentences, what would be your policy on unrecoverable encryption systems? Justify your position.
and been	onymous is a decentralized international "hacktivist" group that primarily targets governments agencies using methods such as leaking of data and denial of service attacks. They have a active for over 15 years and continue to this day with their recent campaign retaliating
	nst Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. [5 points] What are some of the societal benefits of having a decentralized hacktivist group? Are there any risks or negatives? If so, do you think the benefits outweigh the risks or not? Explain.

Final Exam – Appendix

Do not open this document until instructed to begi	in the exam.
This appendix contains code and data that you will be You may use this appendix as scratch space, but nothing	* *
Please write your name below and turn in this append	lix with your completed exam:
-	(Print your name)
	(Uniqname)

Used for Question 2, Part (g) i.

XOR Reference Table

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	В	C	D	E	F
0	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Α	В	С	D	E	F
1	1	0	3	2	5	4	7	6	9	8	В	A	D	C	F	E
2	2	3	0	1	6	7	4	5	Α	В	8	9	E	F	C	D
3	3	2	1	0	7	6	5	4	В	A	9	8	F	E	D	C
4	4	5	6	7	0	1	2	3	C	D	E	F	8	9	A	В
5	5	4	7	6	1	0	3	2	D	C	F	E	9	8	В	A
6	6	7	4	5	2	3	0	1	E	F	C	D	A	В	8	9
7	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	F	E	D	C	В	A	9	8
8	8	9	A	В	C	D	E	F	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9	9	8	В	A	D	C	F	E	1	0	3	2	5	4	7	6
A	A	В	8	9	E	F	C	D	2	3	0	1	6	7	4	5
В	В	A	9	8	F	E	D	C	3	2	1	0	7	6	5	4
C	С	D	E	F	8	9	A	В	4	5	6	7	0	1	2	3
D	D	C	F	E	9	8	В	A	5	4	7	6	1	0	3	2
E	E	F	C	D	A	В	8	9	6	7	4	5	2	3	0	1
F	F	E	D	C	В	A	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

Used for Question 5, Part A

Mungle Application Code

```
1 unsigned int flag = 0;
3 void debugging() {
4
       if(flag == 59245448) {
5
            puts("Flag was set to true.");
6
            exit(0);
7
       } else {
8
           puts("Flag was set to false.");
9
           exit(1);
10
       }
11 }
12
void send(char* arg1, char* arg2, FILE* usernameFile, FILE* passwordFile) {
14
       unsigned int* lenPtr;
       unsigned long int maxLen; // 8 bytes
15
16
       char subject[16];
17
       char password[16];
18
       char comment[48];
19
       char username[16];
20
21
       fread(username, sizeof username, 1, usernameFile);
22
       fread(password, sizeof password, 1, passwordFile);
23
       strcpy(comment, arg1);
24
       strcpy(subject, arg2);
25
       int res = POST(username, password, comment, subject);
26
27
       if(res > 1) {
28
          *lenPtr = maxLen;
29
       }
30 }
31
   int main(int argc, char **argv) {
33
       FILE* usernameFile = fopen("username_file.txt", "r");
34
       FILE* passwordFile = fopen("password_file.txt", "r");
35
36
       send(argv[1], argv[2], usernameFile, passwordFile);
37
       return 1;
38 }
```

Relevant Mungle Server Code

```
1 def receive(req):
       username = req['username']
2
3
       password = req['password']
4
       subject = req['subject']
5
       comment = req['comment']
6
7
       q = query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '"
                 + username + "' AND password = '" + password)
8
9
       if len(q) == 0:
10
11
           return 0
12
       elif len(q) == 1:
           # Posts the comment with subject for the user
13
15
       else:
16
           return 2
```