Description
Game theory and mechanism design offer an important tool to model,
analyze, and solve decentralized design problems involving autonomous
decision-making agents that interact strategically. The Nobel Prize in
Economic Sciences for the year 2012 was awarded to legendary game
theorists Lloyd Shapley and Alvin Roth for their influential work on using
game theory for designing matching markets. The Nobel Prize in 2007 was
jointly awarded to celebrated economists Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and
Roger Myerson for laying the foundations of mechanism design theory. In
2005, Thomas Schelling and Robert Aumann received the Nobel prize for
their path breaking work in game theory. John Nash, Reinhard Selten, and
John Harsanyi received the Nobel prize in 1994 for their pioneering work
in game theory.
In the past 15 years, game theory and mechanism design have clearly emerged as an important discipline for solving problems in computer science and Internet economics. Examples of these problems include design of
algorithms for selfish agents, design of sponsored search auctions on the
web, design of digital markets in electronic commerce, design of robust
communication protocols, analysis of social networks, design of
incentives for crowdsourcing, online education, etc. A modern discipline,
algorithmic game theory, which is concerned with design and analysis of algorithms involving strategic agents, is now an active research area.
The objective of this course is to teach the foundations of game theory to
help students apply game theory to problem solving in a rigorous way. At
the end of this course, the students would be able to model real-world
situations using game theory, analyze the situations using game theoretic
concepts, and design correct and robust solutions (mechanisms, algorithms,
protocols) that would work for strategic agents.
The course will be in four parts:
(1) Noncooperative Game Theory (Narahari)
(2) Cooperative Game Theory (Narahari)
(3) Mechanism Design (Siddharth)
(4) Algorithmic Game Theory (Siddharth)
analyze, and solve decentralized design problems involving autonomous
decision-making agents that interact strategically. The Nobel Prize in
Economic Sciences for the year 2012 was awarded to legendary game
theorists Lloyd Shapley and Alvin Roth for their influential work on using
game theory for designing matching markets. The Nobel Prize in 2007 was
jointly awarded to celebrated economists Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and
Roger Myerson for laying the foundations of mechanism design theory. In
2005, Thomas Schelling and Robert Aumann received the Nobel prize for
their path breaking work in game theory. John Nash, Reinhard Selten, and
John Harsanyi received the Nobel prize in 1994 for their pioneering work
in game theory.
In the past 15 years, game theory and mechanism design have clearly emerged as an important discipline for solving problems in computer science and Internet economics. Examples of these problems include design of
algorithms for selfish agents, design of sponsored search auctions on the
web, design of digital markets in electronic commerce, design of robust
communication protocols, analysis of social networks, design of
incentives for crowdsourcing, online education, etc. A modern discipline,
algorithmic game theory, which is concerned with design and analysis of algorithms involving strategic agents, is now an active research area.
The objective of this course is to teach the foundations of game theory to
help students apply game theory to problem solving in a rigorous way. At
the end of this course, the students would be able to model real-world
situations using game theory, analyze the situations using game theoretic
concepts, and design correct and robust solutions (mechanisms, algorithms,
protocols) that would work for strategic agents.
The course will be in four parts:
(1) Noncooperative Game Theory (Narahari)
(2) Cooperative Game Theory (Narahari)
(3) Mechanism Design (Siddharth)
(4) Algorithmic Game Theory (Siddharth)
General Information
Class Schedule
9:30 AM to 11 AM on Wednesdays and Fridays (with Mondays, 9:30 AM -11 AM, as backup)
Lecture Location
CSA Lecture Hall 117
Test Schedule
First Test: January 29 (will account for 10% of the final marks)
Second Test: February 26 (10%)
Third Test: Tentatively on March 26 (10%)
Final Exam: April last week (30%)
Second Test: February 26 (10%)
Third Test: Tentatively on March 26 (10%)
Final Exam: April last week (30%)
Logistics
The course project will account for 25% of the final grade. Also, 15% of the overall grade will be based on assignments and class participation.
| Name | Office Hours | |
|---|---|---|
Siddharth Barman | When? Where? | |
Ganesh Sambhaji Ghalme | When? Where? | |
Pooja Kulkarni | When? Where? | |
Shivika Narang | When? Where? | |
Arpita | When? Where? | |
Y Narahari | When? Where? | |
nidhi14@math.iisc.ernet.in | When? Where? |